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Abstract 
Recent advances in technology and medical expertise have enabled doctors to 
prolong the lives o f many severely injured patients who only a few years ago would have 
died f rom their injuries. The prolongation of l i fe by such measures has raised many legal, 
ethical and social issues. When in 1992 the House o f Lords determined xnAirdale NHS 
Trust V Bland that life-supporting measures, including artificial nutrition and hydration 
( A N H ) might lawful ly be withdrawn from Anthony Bland, a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS), attention was focused on these issues particularly as they apply to 
the patient in PVS. Since the PVS patient is neither competent to refuse treatment, nor is 
•he dying or suffering, the reasons normally advanced for withdrawing life-supporting 
measures do not apply. In Bland, their Lordships relied on the best interests test laid 
down in Re F (mentalpatient: sterilisation) [1989] 2 A l l ER 545, and, with the exception 
o f Lord Must i l l , on the Bolam test (Bolam v Friern Barnet Hospital Management 
Committee)[\957] 1 W L R 582. This thesis examines the decision inBland and addresses 
some o f the issues raised. The appropriateness o f the best interests test as applied to the 
patient in PVS is explored and compared with the approach o f substituted judgement 
employed in some other common law jurisdictions. The relevance o f the Bolam test to 
decisions regarding the withdrawal of life-supporting measures is considered. The legal 
requirements for the withdrawal o f A N H are discussed, together with the ethical debate 
and the moral dilemmas posed by its withdrawal. Finally, the question as to whether the 
decision in Bland is good law is addressed, and it w i l l be argued that whilst it may be 
morally acceptable to withdraw A N H from some patients, as regards a patient in PVS, the 
moral imperative is that we should not. 
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1. Introduction 
On March 3i"d 1993, Tony Bland, a patient in the Airedale NHS Trust Hospital died 
after the deliberate withdrawal o f l i fe sustaining treatment, including artificial nutrition 
and hydration. For three years prior to that date, Mr . Bland had lain unconscious after 
suffering a severe crushing injury which caused prolonged deprivation o f oxygen to his 
brain and resulted in destruction o f the cerebral cortex, but left the brain stem intact. 
Expert medical attention saved Mr . Bland's l i fe , but the consequences were devastating, 
leaving M r . Bland in a condition o f persistent vegetative state (PVS) f rom which he had 
no hope o f recovery. Doctors in charge o f Anthony Bland came to the conclusion that 
continuation wi th artificial measures o f l ife support merely prolonged his l i fe without 
conferring any benefit to him and that therefore such continuation was not in Anthony's 
best interests. I n order to forestall charges o f illegality, the hospital made an application 
to the High Court to have the proposed course o f action legally sanctioned. The Off ic ia l 
Solicitor was appointed guardian ad litem to uphold Anthony Bland's interests. The High 
Court allowed the application, as did the Court o f Appeal and the House o f Lords on 
appeal f r o m the lower courts. What made Tony Bland's death legally significant, was that 
at the t ime o f the withdrawal, Tony Bland was neither "brain dead" nor was natural death 
inevitable and imminent. He was in a condition known as a persistent vegetative state, a 
phrase coined by Professors Plum and Jennett in 19721. Prima facie, the intentional act o f 
withdrawing medical treatment constitutes both a c iv i l breach o f the duty o f care and the 
crime o f murder. However in Airedale NHS Trust v BlancP- the House o f Lords held, 
albeit on narrow legal grounds, that in certain circumstances, "medical treatment", 
including artif icial feeding and the administration o f antibiotics could lawful ly be 
withheld. Tony Bland fe l l wi th in that category. Their Lordships however, made clear the 
narrow grounds o f their decision and intimated that any expansion o f that decision would 
be for Parliament and not the Courts to determine. The case of Bland raised for the first 
time in English courts the question in what circumstances i f any, may a doctor lawful ly 
discontinue l i fe sustaining treatment? To date the English courts have had to consider the 
legal issues only in the context o f patients wi th PVS; other jurisdictions however, have 
addressed them in deterrnining the legality o f withdrawal o f treatment f rom patients with 
other medical conditions, which although significantly different f rom PVS, preseilt 
similar legal, ethical and moral dilemmas. Here, i t is intended to examine the exact 
parameters o f Bland, any deficiencies in the law highlighted by that case, and the basis 
upon which Parliament might consider appropriate reforms. In doing so, the law prior to 
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Bland w i l l be examined, together with any changes in the current English law occasioned 
by Bland, and the approaches taken by other common law systems to the dilemmas o f the 
withdrawal o f medical treatment f rom incompetent patients in general, and patients in 
PVS in particular. To do this it is essential to understand the legally accepted definition o f 
death itself, how the law has attempted to keep pace with advances in medical 
technology, and the nature and consequences o f the condition o f PVS, and, where 
relevant, other similar conditions. 
Persistent Vegetative State 
Persistent vegetative state is the name coined by Plum and Jennett to describe a 
particular type o f coma. I t is essentially different f rom other types o f coma, and from 
brain stem death, and in legal contexts must be distinguished f rom them, although some 
o f the legal, issues pertinent to PVS patients may be relevant to patients suffering other 
medical conditions in which brain function is seriously and permanently impaired 3. 
Patients in PVS have permanently lost the function o f the cerebral cortex, which is 
that part o f the brain controlling the higher functions o f sapience and cognition that is the 
capacity to feel and to be aware. A differential diagnosis between loss o f the cerebral 
cortex and loss o f the brain stem must be made, since loss o f function o f the latter 
constitutes brain stem death, whereas loss o f the former does not, and the patient is 
therefore alive and must be treated accordingly. PVS most often arises either as a result 
o f trauma to the cortical tissue in an accident, or fol lowing oxygen starvation due to 
cardiac arrest. In these patients, that part o f the brain controlling basic functions such as 
breathing remains active and the patient is therefore not dependent on artificial 
ventilation for survival. These patients are neither conscious and alert nor are they brain 
stem dead. They may have periods o f apparent wakefulness and may respond to painful 
stimuli wi th eye movement or jerky involuntary limb retraction, but they are unable to 
make voluntary actions or respond to the environment in any meaningful way. They 
exhibit wakefulness without awareness, and in short have suffered cognitive death. 
Research has shown that after extensive trauma or anoxia to the brain, any recovery w i l l 
invariably occur in the fol lowing three months, thereafter the condition is permanent and 
there is no reasonable possibility o f return to a cognitive and sapient state. Whilst in this 
state a patient can neither enjoy comfort nor suffer pain, hunger thirst or anxiety, and it 
fol lows that for these patients the term "quality o f l i f e " is meaningless. Further, since 
voluntary activity is not possible the normal bodily functions o f eating, drinking and the 
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evacuation o f bowel and bladder must be accomplished by artificial means involving 
intrusive medical procedures. However, since the heart and lungs function normally, in 
the absence o f medical complications such as infection, such a patient may live for many 
years. 
Tony Bland had been in this condition since suffering a severe crush injury in the 
Hillsborough football disaster three years earlier. 
1 Jennett B. and Plum F. The Persistent Vegetative State: a syndrome in search of a name, Lancet, 1972 734. 
2 Airdale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 (HL), [1993] 2WLR 316 
3 Many of the relevant USA cases concern patients not suffering PVS but from other, conditions 
2. The Relevant Law Prior To Bland 
In Bland the courts were asked to give the answer to two questions; whether the 
Airedale NHS Trust and the doctors attending Anthony Bland could:-
1. .. . l awful ly discontinue all l i fe sustaining treatment and medical support measures 
designed to keep him alive in his existing persistent vegetative state, including 
the termination o f ventilation, nutrition and hydration by artificial means; and 
2. .. . l awful ly discontinue, and thereafter need not furnish medical treatment except 
for the sole purpose o f enabling him to end his l ife peacefully, with the greatest 
dignity and the least pain and suffering. 
Behind these legal questions lie moral, ethical, medical and social issues which are 
o f fundamental importance, and any legislative criteria for determining such issues must 
therefore seek to reflect either a consensus view or the legitimacy o f conflicting views. 
As yet insufficient consultation has been carried out to determine such criteria, but in the 
absence o f legislation, judicial decisions based on accepted legal principles must suffice. 
1 
The questions posed in Bland challenged the legality o f the proposed action by the 
doctors, and in particular raised the fo l lowing legal points:-
The possibility of:-
1. Criminal l iabili ty for murder by either:-
i) a positive act o f commission, or 
i i ) an omission where there existed a duty to provide care. 
2. Liabi l i ty for battery by giving medical treatment without consent outwith the best 
interests o f the patient. 
3. C i v i l l iabili ty for breach o f a duty o f care. 
In addressing these legal issues regard must be taken not only o f legal principles 
which fo rm the basis o f English law, but also moral and ethical values upon which our 
society is founded. O f these, the principle o f the sanctity o f human life may be pre-
eminent ,but must in some circumstances cede to others such as necessity and the 
principle o f autonomy or self determination. 
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The Doctor's Duty 
Firstly, a doctor, no less than any other person must act within the criminal law. 
Secondly a fundamental obligation upon a doctor is negative; in the absence o f consent, 
he may administer no treatment to a competent adult patient. To do so is a trespass to the 
person and may constitute a battery.2 Lastly, a doctor owes a duty to treat his patient with 
proper skil l and care, which has been accepted by the courts as to act in accordance with 
a responsible and competent body o f professional opinion — the Bolam test {Bolam v 
Friern,Hospital Management Committee) 3. 
The Sanctity of Life and Criminal Liability 
Before examining the principle itself, it is essential to determine what exactly can be 
accounted as l i fe , and at which point death is held to have occurred. 
Modem medical technology offers doctors not only the opportunity to treat and cure 
previously untreatable conditions, but also enables resuscitation and life prolonging 
measures which have revolutionised the treatment o f patients who would hitherto 
inevitably have died f rom their injury or illness. As a result, where once cessation o f 
breathing and heartbeat was definitive o f death, since both can now be maintained by 
art if icial means, some other criterion is required. Such interventions giving as they do the 
appearance o f continuing l i fe when in reality there may be none, means that the absolute 
demarcation between l i fe and death may be diff icul t , but since 1979, the medical 
profession has accepted that when irreversible brain damage is diagnosed, and it is 
established by tests that none o f the vital centres in the brain stem are still functioning, 
the patient is to be accounted dead^. Ian Kennedy describes death in these terms; 
"The view has been accepted that the state which has traditionally been regarded 
as death in a human being is reached when the brain stem is destroyed" 5 
Thus the identification o f brain death means that a patient is truly dead whether or 
not some functions such as heart beat are still maintained by artificial means. Loss of 
function o f any other part o f the brain, however extensive, which leaves the brain stem 
intact does not equate wi th death .But see Stephens J in Cruzan:-^ 
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"But for patients like Nancy Cruzan who have no consciousness and no chance 
of recovery, there is a serious question as to whether the mere persistence of 
their bodies is "life" as that word is commonly understood" 
The ability to sustain life is o f fair ly recent origin but although the determination o f 
death is a matter o f law, medical evidence is the only criterion upon which the court can 
act. Hence, although there is no statutory definition o f death, the law has attempted to 
keep pace wi th medical advances by accepting a definition reliant on the medical 
diagnosis o f "brain stem" death, which in MalcherelO, the court accepted as the medical 
criterion for death, although the court did not itself give it as the legal definition. 
Thus even though it may be technically possible to maintain respiration and 
heartbeat in patients who have lost all function o f the brain stem almost indefinitely, such 
interventions merely ventilate what is in effect a corpse and the discontinuation o f those 
" l i f e sustaining" measures is not unlawfii l (MalcherekS). However, in the context o f 
switching o f f l i fe support machines, a distinction may be drawn between patients who 
are clinically dead, brain stem death having been demonstrated, and those patients who 
are alive but death is imminent and inevitable. In the latter category life support may be 
withdrawn because notwithstanding that the patient is still clinically alive, the doctors in 
charge consider that there is no therapeutic, or other justification for continuing the life 
support, and that therefore the patient should be allowed to die. The law has recognised 
this and in such circumstances applies no sanctions for "allowing to die". Arguably this 
distinction has been drawn too sharply. In Bland Lord G o f f himself accepted that 
although any active intervention to end life crosses the Rubicon between lawful and 
unlawful action, the law is open to a charge o f hypocrisy in precluding positive action to 
put a patient "out o f his misery" where to do so would be more humane than merely 
allowing h im to die. Be that as it may, the law at present sanctions no positive action to 
end l i fe . However, as regards "allowing to die", the discontinuance o f "heroic measures" 
w i l l take account primarily o f the therapeutic value and subsequent quality o f l ife, set 
against the invasiveness o f the treatment and the pain and suffering involved, but may in 
addition include such considerations as the scarcity o f resources and the wishes o f the 
relatives, none o f which are relevant in a case o f "brain death". 
Thus, even though brain stem death is now the medically and legally accepted 
defini t ion o f death, the law recognises that heroic measures may defer death for a 
significant length o f time for patients when there is no hope o f recovery, or real benefit to 
the patient, and has therefore limited the duty o f doctors to treatment which is neither 
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fut i le nor outwith the "best interests" o f that patient, and which therefore allows 
discontinuance o f l i fe sustaining treatment in appropriate circumstances. 
I t seems then, that advances in medical technology have blurred the old certainties 
between l i fe and death in that the precept o f " l i f e " now encompasses shades o f being 
which may not necessarily require the absolute protection o f all human life nor the 
absolute prohibition o f taking l ife . Both at the very beginnings o f l ife, in the treatment o f 
embryos and the sanctioning o f abortions, to the end o f l ife in the balancing o f heroic l i fe 
sustaining measures against the burdens o f that treatment for the patient, and his 
subsequent quality o f l i fe , the principle o f the sanctity o f l i fe meaning life itself, appears 
to have been has been reinterpreted. I f not eroded as such by other principles and 
considerations, safictity o f l i fe now seems to equate more with human dignity than with 
mere prolongation o f bodily function. 
Nevertheless, l i fe represents a deep rooted value immanent in our society and its 
protection is a fundamental humanitarian precept and a primary function o f the criminal 
law. Indeed, Blackstone declared it to be the first regard o f English law9. The sanctity or 
l i fe therefore, is the cornerstone o f legal decisions regarding life and death, but it is not 
absolute and cannot be the overriding principle in all circumstances'0. However, absent 
such defences, the law imposes a prohibition on the taking o f l ife. Furthermore there is 
sometimes a fine line between causing the death o f another person and allowing another 
to die, but prima facie, in the absence o f a legal defence, an intentional act on behalf o f 
one competent person which brings about the death o f any other person constitutes the 
crime o f murder. This principle extends to acts which hasten death, other than those acts 
which serve to alleviate pain and suffering, but which may also have the dual effect o f 
shortening l i fe provided that death is in any case inevitable and imminent (Adams'!) . In 
Adams Devl in J. unequivocally set out the position-
"No doctor, nor any man, no more in the case of the dying than of the healthy, 
has the right deliberately to cut the thread of life" 
and 
" I f the acts done intended to ki l l , and did in fact, ki l l , it did not matter i f a life 
were cut short by weeks or months, it was just as much murder as i f it were cut 
short by years". 12 
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However, in his instruction to the ju ry he included the passage:-
" I f the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of health, can no longer be 
achieved, there is still much for a doctor to do, and he is entitled to do all that is 
proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even i f the measures he takes 
incidentally shorten life".'3 
Nevertheless it seems clear that other than in the above circumstances, an intentional 
act by a physician in charge o f a l iving patient which is intended to, and does in fact 
cause the death o f that patient, w i l l amount to the crime o f murder i f the act is committed 
wi th the requisite mens rea (see Cox 1992'4). 
The Criminal Law and Omissions 
The law draws a distinction between acts o f commission and acts o f omission, and in 
the absence o f a duty o f care there is no general liability for omissions, but a duty does 
arise where it is undertaken either voluntarily or as a result o f some special relationship 
Clearly in a doctor-patient relationship, the doctor has assumed the duty to care for his 
patient, and wi th the consent o f that patient, render such care as accords with that which 
might be given by a responsible body o f medical opinion (theBolam test'^). This test, 
relying as it does solely on medical practice, at best differs significantly f rom the general 
reasonable care test for negligence, and furthermore appears incompatible with the best 
interests test set out inReF^^JI 
Clearly there must be a duty before we can properly speak o f an omission, however 
even where there is a duty does liability arise as much for an omission as for a positive 
act? There is no doubt that murder and manslaughter by omission are possible, although 
in such cases the causative link may prove harder to establish than where a positive act is 
the causation, and manslaughter is the usual conviction in homicide due to omissions (R v 
Gibbins and Proctor) 18 (Reg v Stone) 19. 
In the f ie ld o f medicine there is recognised a very important distinction in that, in the 
words o f Glanville Williaras:-
"Whereas killing your patient is absolutely taboo, according to present law and 
. official medical ethics, letting your patient die is qualifiedly permissible, namely 
when the patient is dying and there is no point in continuing his agony"20 
12 
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The point was determined in Re B (a minor) (1981) 1 WLR^K Court held that there 
may be cases where the l i fe o f the child would demonstrably be so awful as to jus t i fy the 
withholding o f medical intervention; and also in Arthur (7P57j22 
I t is clear then that the omission o f a duty either voluntarily undertaken, or imposed 
by a relationship, may give rise to criminal or c iv i l liability, and indeed where a failure to 
provide food or procure medical treatment may indeed result in a conviction for 
manslaughter (R v Stone) but that withholding food and allowing a patient to die is not 
necessarily unlawful (Re B) . However, the act o f fai l ing to provide artificial nutrition, as 
in Bland may not be so easily categorised either as a lawful act o f omission as inArthur's 
case or a criminal omission as in Stone.'^^ 
I t is clear also that there is overwhelming medical opinion that artificial feeding is a 
medical procedure, and that for the time being at any rate the courts are content to accept 
this view. However there is a minority medical opinion to the contrary, expressed in 
evidence to the court in Bland, furthermore there is by no means a consensus amongst 
commentators.24 I f it is accepted that artificial feeding is medical treatment, there may be 
a significant moral and legal difference between the withholding o f artificial nutrition and 
the withholding o f food, since the former is governed by principles applicable 
specifically to medical care, and the latter by those o f a duty to provide the necessities o f 
life.(For further dscusion on this point see chapter 6) 
The withdrawal o f a feeding tube is undoubtedly a positive act, but so equally is the 
switching o f f o f a ventilator, as is the giving o f a lethal injection or the cutting o f a 
mountaineer's rope. In some circumstances however, a ventilator may lawful ly be 
switched o f f to allow a patient to die and is not seen to equate with a positive act o f 
commission, which whatever the condition o f or prognosis for the patient is deemed 
unlawful . I f the withdrawal o f artificial feeding can properly be classed as a positive act, 
then undoubtedly it amounts to unlawfii l k i l l ing. I t is submitted that withdrawing 
treatment must be classified as an omission in a similar category o f not initiating 
treatment, and thus, unless there is a positive duty to act, neither withdrawal nor non-
initiation is unlawful . O f course equally, where there is such a duty neither is lawful . . 
Furthermore, the withdrawal o f A N H obviously is an omission where the means o f 
delivery is left i n situ, but no nutrition is administered. I t would seem unduly pedantic to 
classify this an omission but the removal o f any feeding tube, an act o f commission, 
where the intention and result are identical. However, since a doctor w i l l have a duty to . 
his patient, whether withdrawal can be classed as an act or an omission, there is a 
13 
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possibility that either course might be unlawful .Thus the intentional physical act o f 
withdrawing the means o f delivering medical treatment in the form o f artificial nutrition 
and hydration without which the patient w i l l inevitably die, Aoesprima facie amount to 
murder notwithstanding the best motives o f the physician in charge (see R v Cox). 
However further matters must be considered. 
Tortious Liability and the Issues of Consent 
Important as is the sanctity o f l i fe principle, it is but one o f a number o f principles 
upon which law is founded: One such fundamental principle o f English law is that every 
person's body is inviolate, and in that therefore in the absence o f consent, any intentional 
physical contact is prima facie tortious. {Cole v Turner^^). Thus every competent adult 
has an absolute right to decide what is not done to his body; (the converse however is not 
true since the law circumscribes the limits o f consensual harm — Brown et al 799226. 
This means that in the absence o f consent, an intentional act o f physical contact by one 
person upon another, is a trespass against the person {Wilson vPringle'^'^). In the context 
o f medical treatment, unlike the position in the United States, where the principle o f self-
determination is given effect by the doctrine o f informed consent, in the U K there is no 
such doctrine {Chatterton v Gerson^^), and medical care is governed by the tortious 
principle o f consent. The English doctrine thus dictates that an adult patient who suffers 
no mental incapacity, has an absolute right to choose whether to consent to, or refuse 
medical treatment. This right is subject only to the qualifications o f necessity to undertake . 
lifesaving treatment in circumstances where there is no opportunity to obtain consent, or 
possibly fo l lowing re S29 in a case which may lead to the death o f a viable foetus. 
Furthermore, the decision to consent or refuse is not limited to decisions which others 
might consider sensible {Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital[\9%S}^% and as regards 
adult patients, no one other than the patient himself can give valid consent. This applies 
equally to the competent and incompetent alike {Re F^^). I t is clear then that as regards a 
competent adult, in the absence o f consent, any medical treatment requiring physical 
contact is unlawful . However, what is the position o f the incompetent patient? 
The Incompetent Patient 
Incompetent patients can be divided into three main categories; those adults 
temporarily incompetent; the permanently incompetent, and children. Issues o f consent 
vary wi th each category. 
14 
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The temporarily incompetent may be given such medical treatment as is necessary to 
save the patient's l ife on the basis o f the principles o f necessity and implied consent: the 
exact parameters o f lawful treatment are unclear but fa l l outside the present discussion. 
The Permanently Incompetent. 
Medical care o f the adult incompetent is,now governed by the principle o f best 
interests as laid down in the seminal case of Re F. Re F concerned the case o f a thirty-six 
year old mentally retarded woman who had formed a sexual relationship with a fel low 
patient. I t was the opinion o f the majority o f her carers that she would be unable to cope 
wi th either pregnancy, or childbirth, and would be incapable o f caring for any child born 
to her. In all the circumstances it was felt that sterilisation o f F was desirable. However, 
the operation could not be performed without authorisation and since F herself was 
incompetent to give valid consent, the question thus arose as to who could consent to the 
operation on her behalf Had F been a minor no such problem would have arisen since the 
wardship jurisdiction o f the High Court would have sufficed, but in Re F the House o f 
Lords confirmed that the courts no longer have any powers either to consent on behalf o f 
an incompetent adult patient, nor to dispense with the need for consent. Such powers 
would depend either on statutory provision, o f which there is none since The Mental 
Health Ac t 1983 makes no provision for the giving o f medical care, other than such care 
relating to the treatment o f the mental condition o f the patient, or on parens patriae 
jurisdiction. The latter arose f rom the constitutional responsibility o f the monarch for the 
welfare o f any subject suffering such disability as to render him incompetent incapable; 
such powers could be delegated by Royal Warrant to the courts who then exercised 
jurisdiction. Unfortunately the last such warrant was revoked in 1960. However, the 
courts do retain inherent power to make minors wards o f court where, on application 
f rom an interested party, the court considers it appropriate. This means that although the 
primary responsibility for a minor, rests wi th the parent, (or since The Children Act 1989, 
anyone wi th parental responsibility), to give consent to medical treatment, where a child 
is made a ward o f the court, the court can thus give or refuse consent on his behalf The 
court is no longer able to do this for an adult. 
Prima facie then, an adult who cannot consent for himself may receive such 
treatment as would a temporarily incompetent patient which on a strict interpretation o f 
necessity would be such treatment as is immediately l ife saving. However, obviously 
such patient cannot be left without medical care; at the very least, to do so would be in 
15 
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breach o f a duty o f care on the part o f those charged with that duty. In the absence o f 
either statutory or prerogative power to consent for an incompetent adult, the courts must 
look to the common law to determine the lawfulness o f proposed treatment. It is to be 
noted that although relatives are frequently consulted, their consent on behalf o f the 
incompetent has no legal validity. 
In circumstances where medical treatment is deemed necessary for the health or 
well-being o f an incompetent patient,, but cannot be categorised as immediately l ife-
saving two distinct approaches have been identified ; that o f applying the best interest 
principle, and that o f employing the doctrine o f substituted judgement. In English law in 
the seminal case Re F, the House o f Lords determined that in treating an incompetent 
adult, a doctor must act in the best interests o f his patient, to avoid tortious liability, and 
in accordance wi th a recognised body o f medical opinion (Bolam), to defeat a claim in 
negligence. In some other common law jurisdictions, notably the USA substituted 
judgement is the primary approach. In Re F, having identified a lacuna in the law 
regarding consent to medical treatment, their Lordships extended the principle o f 
necessity beyond emergency medical care to cover treatment given to the permanently 
incompetent. In doing so the concept o f necessity appears to have been stretched to the 
extreme. Lord Brandon in particular gave the principle the alarmingly wide parameters o f 
applying to persons lacking capacity "for whatever reason", to be subject to decision 
making by person(s) wi th "the appropriate qualifications" as regards apparently all , or 
any, medical treatment to be given to them32. In other words to hand decision making to 
carers and/or clinicians. A similar line is taken by the House o f Lords in Bland who 
appear to equate necessity wi th best interests and indeed by allowing determination o f 
best interests by reference to Bolam appear also to accept that necessity is governed by 
acceptable medical practice on the same basis as negligence. This however, is in marked 
contrast to the approach in both F and Bland taken by the Court o f Appeal where 
determination o f best interests is taken to consider factors other than mere medical 
opinioh. The relevance o f Bolam in the best interest test is considered more fu l ly in 
Chapter 5; 
Fol lowing Re F then in the U K , whereas a child may be treated on the basis o f 
consent given by the parent or the court, medical treatment o f the incompetent adult can 
be undertaken only under the principles o f necessity and best interest. As an adult 
incompetent Tony Bland could therefore receive lawful ly only medical treatment which 
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was in his best interests. The crucial question for patients such as he, is what those best 
interests are. { 
' The Law Commission has made certain recommendations. Law Com. No. 231, HMSO, 1995. 
2 Wilson V Pringle [1986] 2 Ail ER.440 
3 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1971] 1WLR 582 
4 1979 1BMJ332 
5 Switching Off Life Support Machines: The Legal Implications. In "Treat Me Right", 1988, p351, Ed 
Joanne Lynn. 
6 Stevens J. in Cruzan v Director, Missouri Dept. of Health [1990]110 S.Ct. 2481 @ 2886. 
I R. vMalcherek, Rv Steel [1981] 2 All ER 422 — Cause of death in a patient suffering brain stem death but 
whose vital functions are being maintained by artificial ventilation, is the underlying cause of the injury 
. and not the switching off of the ventilator. 
^ Ibid 427 
9 Blackstone: Commentaries on the Laws of England (1978) 
'0 War, self defence etc. 
I I Reg. V Adams, (unreported), 8 April 1957, Devlin J. 
^2 Ibid, 
^^Ibid 
14 Reg V Cox (unreported), 18 September 1992. Ognall J. — The intentional giving of a lethal injection 
which had no therapeutic purpose to a patient in constant and excruciating pain. 
15 Bolam. v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 
Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1989] All ER 545. Sub. nom F v West Berkshire Health Authority 
(Mental Health Act Commission intervening. 
• 1 The appropriateness of the Bolam Test is examined more fully in Chapter 5. 
18 7? V Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr, App. Rep 134 — man and the woman with whom he was living 
convicted of the murder of his child by deliberate witholding of food. 
19 7?eg. V Stone [1977] QB 374 — conviction for manslaughter for failure to procure medical treatment for a 
dependent relative 
20 Glanville Williams: Criminal Omissions — The Conventional View 1991 L.Q.R.P 
21 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: medical treatment) (1981) [1992] 3 All ER 927 Down's Syndrome baby 
requiring surgery. 
22 Unreported — charge of attempted murder where doctor in charge administered drug to sedate new-bom 
Down's baby and ordered nursing staff to withhold food and give "nursing care only", the question being 
left to the jury as to whether the doctor's action was a culpable positive act or merely allowed the child to 
die lawfully. 
23 In Bland Mr. Munby for the official Solicitor attempted to draw an analogy with Stone which was 
expressly rejected by Butler-Sloss LJ — the point is further discussed below under the head The Decision 
in Bland 
24 A fuller discussion is undertaken later in Chapter 6. 
25 Cole V Turner (1704) 6. Mod, 149 
26 Reg V Brown [1992] 2 All Er 75 — conviction for sado-masochism between consenting adults. 
27 Wilson V Pringle [1986] 2 All ER 440 
28 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432 
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29 Re S (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 all ER 671 — caesarian section performed on a mother 
in the face of her refusal, to save the life of her unborn child, It is to be noted that although this decision is 
in conflict with the decision in Re T that a competent adult has an absolute right to refuse medical 
treatement, unlike T, S was decided at first instance only. 
30 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and The Maudsley Hospital [1981] 
A.C.871. 
31 Re F Sterilisation: Mental patient [1989] All ER 545. 
^2 Re F [1990] A.Cat55. 
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The Best Interests Approach 
The genesis of the best interests test, and thus the basis of the decision in Bland was 
the landmark case of Re in which the court was asked to determine whether a doctor 
would be acting lawfully i f he carried out a sterilisation operation on an adult patient who 
was herself incapable of consenting to treatment. In concluding that in the circumstances 
of the case, such an operation lawfully could be performed, the House of Lords 
engendered a novel concept in English law : that of best interests. Re F highlighted a 
lacuna in the law relating to consent to medical treatment, for whereas medical treatment 
may be given to a child on the basis of consent given by its parent(s)2, or under the 
wardship jurisdiction of the court, no-one, other than the patient himself may now 
consent for an adult patient. Furthermore, consent cannot be dispensed with except for 
emergency treatment. Their Lordships declared that for an incompetent adult, the proper 
test for giving medical treatment is that such treatment must be in the best interests of the 
patient. However, in promulgating this new concept, their Lordships appeared to rely on 
two well established principles; the welfare test applicable to the treatment of minors, and 
the Bolam test which governs the extent of a doctor's duty to his patient. The application 
of this latter test in an area where decisions may rest as much on ethical, as medical 
criteria, has caused no little concern amongst medical and legal commentators alike3. 
Development of The Best Interest Test 
The best interests test for all incompetent patients developed through cases in which 
Courts were requested to use their powers to giye consent or refusal to treatment for 
handicapped neonates, e. g. Re J [1990]4, Arthur^, (1981 unreported), Re B(>(a 
minor;medical treatment)(19810[1990]. Re CP[1989], and ReJ{\992]^. 
In Re B, the case of a Downs Syndrome baby with a life threatening but operable 
intestinal obstruction and a prognosis of a reasonable quality of life thereafter, the court 
consented to treatment on the grounds that the life of this child would not be 
"demonstrably so awful" as to condemn the child to death by refusing consent for the 
operation, but it was made clear that there might well be cases in which the court might 
be driven to a different conclusion. Shortly after the decision in Re B, in the case of 
Arthur'^ a clear distinction was made by the judge between killing and lawfully allowing 
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to die. Dr Arthur stood trial on a charge of attempted murder after ordering "nursing care 
only", and prescribing a sedative drug to a Down's syndrome infant rejected by its 
parents. In Re CiO the court added a further gloss to the framework set out mRe B. The 
case concerned the treatment to be given to an infant bom with severe hydrocephalus and 
brain malformation, together with gross physical deformity. A palliative operation was 
performed to prevent further pressure in the skull, but it was apparent that no degree of 
medical intervention could postpone death for more than a very short time. The question 
arose as to what treatment to give should the child develop an infection or other 
complication. The High court took the view, inter alia, that the doctors should be free to 
"treat the minor to die" and administer only such treatment as might relieve pain, 
suffering and distress. Notwithstanding that the original order was reworded prior to the 
appeal being heard to read, "to treat to allow her life to come to an end peacefully and 
with dignity", it is clear that this was a case in which the court considered that what little 
life this infant had before death, would with certainty be "demonstrably so awful" so as to 
justify the withholding of life prolonging treatment. 
Later cases further refined the criteria to be applied in considering decisions whether 
or not to give or withhold medical treatment from minors. In Re J [1990]!', Lord 
Donaldson said:-
"In deciding whether to authorise that treatment need not be given, the court had 
to perform a balancing exercise in the course to be adopted in the best interests 
of the child, looked at from his point of view and giving the fullest possible 
weight to his desire, if he were in a position to make a sound judgement and 
taking into account the pain and suffering and quality of life which he would 
experience if life were prolonged, and the pain and suffering involved in the 
proposed treatmenf'.12 
In these two cases then, the basis was laid down of a "critical equation" between 
benefits and burdens which must be evaluated when considering whether to consent to 
treatment which the doctors in charge deemed appropriate. 
Apart from these cases dealing with decisions to treat or refrain from treating 
handicapped babies, a series of cases, notably i?e 513 and Re i^l4, fell to be decided, in 
which the issue was whether sterilisation was in the best interest of a patient where that 
patient was legally incompetent. These cases covered both incompetent adults and minors 
who although i f of ful l mental capacity may have been Gillick competent to consent on 
their own behalf to most medical treatment (although it is unlikely that that would extend 
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to sterilisation), suffered severe mental retardation'^ .(notwithstanding the provision of s. 
8 (3) of The Family Reform Act 1969, which gives minors over the age of 16 the power 
to consent to medical treatments. A minor below that age has that capacity provided that 
he has sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand what is proposed.). 
In Re B the court had no difficulty in deciding that as regards minors, a court 
exercising its wardship jurisdiction should apply the same principles as would a fully 
competent and reasonable adult to regulate his own medical treatment, or a reasonable 
parent in relation to his child that is the test applied by their Lordships was, per Lord 
Hailsham L. C., P. 202 
"the well-being, welfare or interests of the human being concerned, that is the 
ward herself or himself 16 
and per Lord Bridge 
"It [the appeal] is concemed with one primary consideration and one alone, 
namely the welfare and best interest of this young woman"' ^  
The principles to be applied in the treatment of incompetents were then brought 
together and clearly set out in Re F^ Prior to theis case the law as regards the medical 
treatment of the adult incompetent patient was unclear ; in the absence of consent, other 
than in an emergency, non-consensual treatment would be at least tortious, and possibly 
criminal. However, since the leading passage by Lord Bridge, in/?e Fthe "best interests" 
test has determined medical treatment for the legally incompetent. In that case Lord 
Bridge uttered the famous passage:-
"It would be intolerable for members of the medical Professions that in caring 
for those lacking the capacity to consent to treattnent, they should be put in the 
dilemma that if they administer the treatment which they believe to be in the 
patient's best interests, acting with due skill and care, they run the risk of being 
held guilty of trespass to the person, but if they withhold that treatment, they 
may be in breach of a duty of care to the patient... I f those who undertake 
responsibility for the care of the incompetent... administer treatment which they 
believe to be appropriate... the lawfulness of that treatment should be judged by 
one standard, not two. It follows that if the professionals have acted with due 
care judged by the well-known standard in Bolam they should be immune from 
liability in trespass just as they are immune from liability in negligence." 19 
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In Re F, the question arose whether F, a 35 year old patient in a mental hospital, with 
a mental capacity of four or five years old, should undergo a sterilisation to prevent her 
becoming pregnant. F was capable of, and apparently enjoyed, a sexual relationship, but 
in the opinion of both her mother and medical staff, she would be unable to comprehend 
either pregnancy or childbirth and would be totally incapable of caring for a child. 
Furthermore, the psychiatric consequences for F of her having a child would be 
"catastrophic". For medical reasons contraception was not a viable option. 
In considering Re F the court took its lead from the sister case of Re 520, where on 
facts essentially identical ,apart from the age of the patient, their Lordships held that in 
practising its wardship jurisdiction to determine medical treatment, the welfare of the 
minor in question is paramount, that welfare being equated with well-being or interests. 
However in contrast to B, F was an incompetent adult and thus in the absence of parens 
patriae jurisdiction, in order that F's doctor's might perform the proposed operation 
without that action being tortious or constituting a criminal battery, some lawfiji basis for 
such action was required. In the context of medical care, patient autonomy gives way to 
paternalism in circumstances of necessity (Cresswell v Strips. However necessity would 
appear to be limited to such medical care as is required to safeguard the patient's life or 
immediate health, and would thus exclude the type of elective treatment to which a 
normal and prudent competent adult might choose to consent. Such elective treatment 
would include the type of treatment proposed for B and F viz. sterilisation. In examining 
the exception of emergency treatment, to the common law rule in Collins v Wilcock^^, 
Lord Donaldson observed:-
" I do not think that the law does, or should regard adults who are in the position 
of F simply as permanent emergency cases. [A doctor] must act in the best 
interests of his patient as he sees them"23 
Further, he said:-
"the test to be applied was the same test which would be applied by any 
competent and reasonable adult to determine his own medicaf treatment, or by 
reasonable parents in relation to their child" 
That test was:-
"What course of action is best calculated to promote my true welfare and 
interests"24 
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In the House of Lords, Lord Goff endorsed this view and Lord Brandon elaborated 
on, and set the parameters of, the test of best interests by stating:-
"The operation or other treatment will be in their best interests if, but only if, it 
is carried out in order either to save their lives, or to ensure improvement or 
prevent deterioration in their physical or mental health"25 
The significance of the above statement is that it appears to preclude any 
considerations other than these (which clearly cannot be correct since that would also 
preclude all pain relieving measures). This would mean that, as is the case for some 
severely handicapped infants, and patients for whom further treatment is futile, and who 
are therefore allowed to die, i f any proposed medical treatment can neither improve 
health, nor prevent deterioration , the best interests of the patient will not be served ,and 
further treatment therefore would be unlawful. However, even apart from these obvious 
omissions, this "therapeutic "test seems too restrictive to deal adequately with all 
considerations likely to be relevant in such cases as sterilisation, termination of 
pregnancy, or tissue donation (to siblings for instance). 
Thus, for the adult incompetent patient, for whom no consent may be given, a doctor 
must act in the best interests of his patient . Furthermore, it is clear that whereas a 
competent patient is free to refuse treatment "for reasons which are rational, or irrational, 
or for no reason at all" (Sidaway'26) — provided that the refusal has not been invalidated 
by a change of circumstance ,Re 7)27^  in the case of an incompetent patient, the best 
interests test is dependent on the welfare of the patient in all the circumstances, and 
therefore includes a decision not to treat. 
As wil l be explored later, it is significant to note that in the wake of Re F and Bland, 
what now constitutes best interests is by no means clear, since whereas the more logical 
approach favours a benefit/burden evaluation (CA in Bland), the other, employed also in 
Bland (HL) relies on the conferring of no benefit, (as determined by the doctors in 
charge- Bolam.) However, what is clear is that whereas best interest in some 
circumstances, notably neonates, would appear dependent on the "critical equation" of 
benefits and burdens, best interests in other circumstances appears to rest on futility. It 
falls to be determined the exact limitation of this exercise, who should perform it, and, i f 
an equation is relevant, which factors may be considered and which should be excluded. 
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The Substituted Judgement Approach. 
The substituted judgement approach has been adopted in some other common law 
jurisdictions, notably the USA, in order for the courts to determine the medical treatment 
afforded to adult incornpetent patients. It is to be noted that unlike the present situation in 
the UK, most of the States in the USA, where substituted judgement is the norm in such 
cases, retain wardship jurisdiction in some circumstances in relation to adult 
incompetents. The essence of the doctrine of substituted judgement, is that a patient who 
is incompetent, is to be given such medical treatment as he would himself have chosen, 
had he been competent to do so. As such, the doctrine is essentially different from the 
"best interests" principle, in that the latter is an objective test whereas substituted 
judgement is as far as possible subjective, and may therefore be considered as upholding 
the right of personal autonomy better than does the best interests principle. Thus, just as a 
competent patient has the right to refuse treatment for no rational reason, but merely on 
his own preference, so, by employing the substituted judgement principle, may the 
presumed actual, wishes of an incompetent patient be followed, (provided that those 
wishes can be ascertained). 
The origins of the doctrine may be found in English trust law in the area of the 
administration of the estate of an incompetent person, and in particular the early 
nineteenth century case of Ex Parte Whitbread In Re Hinde'^^. The doctrine was utilised 
to authorise a gift from the estate of a Lunatic (sic) in circumstances where the 
incompetent owed no duty to support the donee. The court in considering such gifts, set 
out the principle by which the court must act in sanctioning gifts by incompetent donors 
in these circumstances, and accomplished the purpose by substituting itself as nearly as 
possible for the incompetent, and acting on the same motives and considerations as would 
have moved him. Lord Eldon L.C. said the court should:-
"[apply] the property... in such a manner as the court thinks it would have been wise 
and prudent of the lunatic himself to apply it, in case he had been capable"29 
Thus the English court, in making the substituted judgement, did so on the basis of a 
"reasonable man" test which imbues the subjective decision in the doctrine with an 
element of paternalistic objectivity, which rather defeats the object of the exercise, and 
appears to equate more with a best interest approach than a true substituted judgement. 
However, in theory the doctrine in its inception called upon the court to "don the mental 
mantle of the incompetent" as was stated in the American case of /« Re Carson 39 Misc. 
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2d. 544, but whereas in the medical context, the English courts have subsumed an 
incompetent individual's right to self determination within the best interests doctrine, the 
American courts have attempted to retain self determination by the incompetent, by the 
substituted judgement doctrine of English trust law. 
However, it is not altogether clear what the substituted judgement should be, since 
there does appear to be some confusion as to whether it should reflect actual or supposed 
"reasonable" wishes ,and there is a clear distinction between those incompetents who are 
able to express wishes and those unable to do so. 
J 
The Alberta Report describes the test as: 
"An attempt... to ascertain, the mentally incompetent person's actual 
preference"30 
The American courts on the other hand have clearly decided cases on the basis of 
what the incompetent would have decided i f sane, rather than an actual preference, which 
rather begs the question as to whether the incompetent would have made an irrational 
decision even i f sane, or i f it must be assumed that, with the benefit of sanity, his decision 
would be more likely to be rational. 
It may be of interest to note that in the context of the variation of trusts, \nRe C. Z. 31 
, the English court took the view that the mentally incompetent beneficiary's wishes were 
considered purely on the basis of what she would have wanted i f sane. However since it 
is in the American courts that in the context of medical treatment the doctrine has been 
developed, it is to those courts that we must look both for the underlying principles, and 
for the criteria on which to ascertain the wishes of the particular incompetent. 
In America, the doctrine has developed largely in the context of terminally i l l 
patients although it has found application in decisions on behalf of the mentally 
incompetent whether to undergo or forego medical treatment. However substituted 
judgement has been employed in the context of some of the more controversial medical 
procedures such as sterilisation and organ donation (Strunk v Strunk)^^. 
In some early US cases then, the principle of substituted judgement was considered 
the appropriate method of upholding the constitutional rights of the mentally 
incompetent. However, the paradigm case for its use as regards comatose patients that is 
patients who had once been competent, is the case of Quinlan^^. 
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At the age of twenty-one Karen Quinlan suffered two episodes of respiratory failure 
as the result of which she suffered extensive brain damage and was placed on a 
respiraitor. She was later diagnosed as being in PVS with no reasonable hope of recovery 
to a cognitive and sapient state, and her father, as her official guardian, applied to the 
court for authorisation'to withdraw the artificial ventilation on the basis that this was what 
Karen herself would have wished. It was the unanimous opinion of her doctors that Karen 
would die i f she was taken off the respirator. The court nonetheless held that the 
constitutional right of privacy which would allow refusal of medical treatment, was not 
lost on incompetency, and could be exercised by a guardian on behalf of the incompetent. 
Thus, in the present case, subject to certain conditions, Karen's father could assert this 
right so as to have artificial ventilation withdrawn. The conditions to be satisfied were 
firstly, that the doctors in charge of Karen and the Hospital Ethics Committee were in 
agreement that there was no reasonable possibility of a return to a cognitive and sapient 
state, and secondly, that the doctors agreed with the father and family in the proposed 
course of action.34 
Two points are significant. Firstly, the criteria apply only to comatose patients (PVS) 
and secondly, the agreement of the Ethics Committee pertains solely to the medical 
prognosis, and not to the decision to withdraw. 
Thus, Quinlan dealt specifically with patients in persistent vegetative state and 
although the question of whether the principles set out in that case might be applicable for 
patients suffering similar types of terminal medical situations was mooted, at that time the 
issues were not addressed. 
However, a few months after Quinlan, suitability of the use of substituted judgement 
in the case of those incompetents who unlike Karen Quinlan had never been competent 
was explored in the case of Saikewicz^^. 
In Saikewicz the question arose as to whether to administer life-saving 
chemotherapy to a mentally incompetent cancer patient. Unlike Karen Quinlan, Joseph 
Saikewicz lacked the capacity either to understand his predicament, or to express a view 
as to his treatment. Whilst reaffirming the substituted judgement approach, the court 
conceded that for the never competent adult, greater reliance must be placed on more 
objective criteria. Thus American courts continued to pay lip service to substituted 
judgement whilst at the same time shifting the emphasis to that of the reasonable man 
test. However seven years after Saikewicz, the courts recognised the limitations of the 
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substituted judgements approach, and in Conroy^(> set out the criteria for not employing 
it in some circumstances. Claire Conroy was in the category of patients who had once 
been incompetent, but whose competence had been lost permanently. The courts 
reaffirmed the doctrine of substituted judgement and rejected the "reasonable man" test. 
"the question is not what a reasonable or average man would have chosen... but 
what the particular patient would have done if able to choose for himself 37 
However, the court added that the patient's intentions must be evidenced clearly, and 
that in the absence of adequate proof, the subjective test must give way to a more 
objective approach. To this end the Court set out the three Cowroy tests to be employed in 
decision making for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. These are:-
1. The subjective test — when it is clear that the patient would have refused 
treatment. 
2. The limited objective test— where there is no clear unequivocal expression of 
wishes prior to incompetence, treatment may nonetheless be withdrawn i f there is 
some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused treatment AND it 
is clear that the burden of pain and suffering of continued life with the treatment 
outweighs the benefits of that treatment. 
The court added:-
"by this we mean that the patient is suffering, and will continue to suffer, 
unavoidable pain throughout the expected duration of his life"38 
3. The objective test — where the pain and suffering of life with the treatment 
clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits, AND, the patient is suffering so much 
pain that the prolonging of life is inhumane. 
The objective test is clearly most like the best interests test in English law. Although 
the decision in Conroy was limited expressly to nursing home patients in PVS whose life 
expectancy is less than one year, two additional points may be made. Firstly, pain appears 
to have been the critical factor in the second and third tests, and secondly, where no 
actual choice can be determined, resort must be had to the "best interest" of the patient. 
Thus although the court in Conroy still paid lip service to the doctrine of substituted 
judgement, in reality, the third Conroy test differs little from the English test. 
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A trilogy of cases decided on the same day in 1987 add a further gloss to the 
doctrine of substituted judgement as it applies in the USA. In the cases ofRe Jobes^^, Re 
Peter^O and Re Farrell^^, the court formulated guidelines and procedures under which 
life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn in circumstances where the limitations of 
Convoy do not exist. In Farrell the court merely confirmed the right of a competent 
patient to refuse treatment. In Peter, the court was asked to determine which, i f any, of 
the Convoy tests was applicable in the case of a patient with PVS who was not expected to 
die within a year. The court held that since it is impossible to assess benefits and burdens 
for such a patient, neither the subjective, nor the limited objective tests are applicable, 
and the court must look "primarily to Quinlan" for guidance [a reasonable possibility of a 
return to a cognitive state]42. However, where, as in the present case, there is clear 
evidence of the patient's previously expressed wishes, the first, subjective test is the first 
recourse. In Jobes there was no such evidence. Judge Handler declared that although the 
substituted judgement approach is the ideal, in some cases it is unworkable, and as 
regards the never competent, is inapplicable, and that therefore the courts must look to 
more objective factors such as "age, terminal illness, imminent death and the extent of 
bodily intrusion and consequent lost of personal dignity". 
Several, more recent cases have added further to the resile from substituted 
judgement. In Stovar^^, the court overruled a proxy decision not to administer a life-
saving blood transfusion to a never competent patient on the grounds that such decisions 
should not be made merely by a close relative feeling that "this is best"44. In Cruzan'^^, 
even the first Convoy test was called into question when, in the face of clear evidence of 
previously expressed wishes, the US Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Supreme 
Court of Missouri that the State of Missouri could dictate the degree of evidence 
required. In Moorhouse^^, the court followed Jobes^l and, in considering withdrawal of 
treatment for a never competent patient, focused on best interests. 
Thus it would appear that in the American courts, the doctrine of substituted 
judgement must now sit alongside the principle of best interests, which corresponds for 
the most part to the best interests tests employed by the English courts. However, in 
contrast to the English courts, the American courts wil l still look first to clear and 
convincing evidence of the patient's wishes expressed when competent ,(subject to State 
requirements) ,but in the absence of such evidence, recourse must be had to a test of best 
interests. 
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Best Interests v Substituted Judgement 
Both the doctrine of substituted judgement and the best interests test have 
advantages and drawbacks. The main advantage of substituted judgement is that, where 
the proxy is sure, (and has sufficient evidence to prove), what the incompetent would 
have wished, the proxy decision wil l approximate the patient's wishes more so than a best 
interests decision, which presupposes that those wishes would be those of "the reasonable 
man" (or more at present likely, those of the doctor). 
However, the best interests test has the advantage of certainty in that whereas 
substituted judgement can never be certain what the patient's wishes would be in the 
present situation. I f competent, the best interests test is determined by the certain view of 
the decision maker as to what he considers are the best interests of the patient under the 
present circumstances. 
Criticism may be levelled at both the substituted judgement, and best interiests 
approaches, the former chiefly on the grounds of uncertainty, the latter because it inclines 
to outmoded medical paternalism. The doctrine of substituted judgement requires clear 
and convincing evidence of the incompetent's wishes, but no matter how much evidence 
we have or how well the surrogate thought he knew the patient's wishes, there will 
always be some doubt. In many cases this doubt may be minimal, but as the certainly 
diminishes other factors weigh more heavily in the decision making process. 
Furthermore, whilst a close family member or friend may usually be relied on to make an 
honest appraisal of what the surrogate, supposes the patient would wish, there is no 
guarantee that all seemingly close relatives would be so altruistic. Even where there is 
incontrovertible evidence of the incompetent's wishes, there remains some doubt as to its 
validity. Mrs. Farrell made her decision on her own initiative, when she was of sound 
mind, and neither clinically depressed, nor under the undue influence of third parties. 
How often could one be so sure? A further argument may be levelled against proxy 
decision-making, in that whilst it is impossible to ascertain the present desires of a patient 
in PVS, other incompetents may be able to express an opinion, and therefore, is it right 
that the incompetent should be subject to the decision of the proxy, especially if, like Mr. 
Storar, the lifesaving measure proposed is unlikely to cause more than minimal distress? 
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In addition to these disadvantages, substituted judgement suffers the obvious drawbacks 
of being purely a fiction where the patient never has been competent, and unworkable 
where the patient has no-one who is sufficiently close to the patient as to be able to know 
what he would have wished. 
The drawbacks of the best interests test are clear. Unlike the substituted judgement 
approach, it relies not on a principle of patient autonomy and self determination, but on 
the paternalistic premise that some other person knows what is best. Since, in the field of 
medicine, no less than in any other area, there are legitimate differences of opinion, 
deciding in the patient's best interests is no more than deciding what the doctor himself 
thinks are his best interests, particularly i f Bolam is the determinative test. 
However, whereas the doctrine of substituted judgement is open to abuse only by the 
evil intent of the surrogate, the best interest approach holds an insidious but far greater 
danger. The best interests test opens the way to abuse, not as a result of evil intent, but 
simply by extension from withdrawing treatment in the best interests of the patient, to 
giving treatment in, what the decision maker considers are his best interests, even i f that 
wil l end his life. As Judge Pollock observed in Jobes:-
"We must be aware of the slippery slope that could lead to the unwarranted 
termination of life"48 
It appears then, that although the substituted judgement approach has been eschewed 
by the English courts, and the best interests approach allowed only a supporting role in 
the USA, the best interests test does seem to be gaining ground, i f only in those cases 
where to employ surrogate decision making is a fiction. Furthermore, whereas the best 
interests approach can accommodate an element of substituted judgement by taking into 
account the known, or even supposed views of the patient, in circumstances where the 
substituted judgement approach is either unworkable or inapplicable, it must give way to 
the objective best interests approach., 
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4. The Decision In Bland 
Albeit on narrow legalistic grounds, the House of Lords in Bland, came to the 
conclusion that it may not be unlawful to discontinue treatment, including artificial 
nutrition and hydration (ANH), given to a permanently insensate patient, even though the 
result of such withdrawal would be the death of that patient. In a unanimous ruling, their 
Lordships held that where a doctor, acting in accordance with a responsible body of 
medical opinion, reaches a reasonable view that continued invasive treatment would no 
longer be in his patient's best interests, medical treatment, including ANH may lawfully 
be discontinued. In his leading judgement. Lord Goff elucidated the legal issues raised, 
but emphasised that the case itself was determined on its own particular facts. 
Nonetheless it is apparent that in cases which are four square with Bland, such 
discontinuation will be lawful. However, not only does the case of Bland itself raise 
serious legal anomalies, but any extension of the principle to like cases would drive a 
coach and horses through the present prohibition on passive euthanasia, and could open 
the door even to active euthanasia. As it happens the expected rush of cases through the 
courts has not happened, but the determination of those few cases which have been 
decided, has done nothing to reduce those fears. 
If Anthony Bland had left clear instructions that should he find himself in the 
circumstances which prevail he did not wish to receive ANH, Sidaway^ determines that 
those wishes must be respected, always bearing in mind the restriction onSidaway placed 
by Ren. 
If Anthony Bland had been a child and ward of court, the decision xnRe B [1988]3, 
would have facilitated treatment in his best interests. Nowi?e F'^ allows acting in the 
patient's best interest to apply to adult incompetents also. H o w e v e r J 5 suggests that 
where continued life will be one of intolerable pain and deprivation, it is right to balance • 
those factors against that of prolonging life, and thus medical treatment may be withheld. 
Clearly, since he had neither sapience nor cognisance, Anthony Bland could not suffer 
and thiis did not fall into the/?e J category, and the courts fell back on the decision mRe 
F and the test of best interests. However, in coming to the decision that it was not in 
Anthony's best interests to continue treatment, there appears more than a little 
discrepancy in the bases for that decision, both between the reasoning of the lower courts 
and the House of Lords, and between their Lordships themselves 
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The High Court Decision 
The High Court Judge, Sir Stephen Brown P., was asked by the plaintiffs (the Trust 
Hospital), to make declarations to the effect that the physicians in charge of AB might 
lawfully discontinue all life sustaining measures intended to keep AB alive, and that 
thereafter need furnish only such treatment designed to allow AB to:-
"end his life and die peacefully with the greatest dignity, and with the least pain 
suffering and distress";^  
In agreeing to those applications. Sir Stephen Brown P, appears to base his decision 
on three propositions; Futility, theBolam test, and the best interests test of Re F, together 
with the concurrence of Anthony Bland's family in that continued medical treatment 
would be of no benefit to AB, and that its withdrawal would be in accordance with good 
medical practice. 
The Court of Appeal Decision. 
In the Court of Appeal, Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Butler-Sloss, and Hoffman LJJ, 
. were unanimous in their view that the test to be applied was that of best interests of Re F, 
and in their conclusion, that AB's best interests lay in discontinuing treatment. All 
accepted that the balancing test in Re Jl was apposite notwithstanding that in that case the 
court was acting in its parens patriae jurisdiction, and notwithstanding also, that since AB 
was permanently insensate, the factors to be taken into account 'v\Re J, that is a life of 
intolerable suffering and deprivation, were absent. However, all three judges averred that 
even in the case of a patient such as AB, there were factors which could rightly be taken 
into account to balance against the principle of the sanctity of life, which militates in 
favour of continuing treatment. Butler-Sloss, whilst firmly excluding the application of 
substituted judgement employed in some other common law jurisdictions, cited the cases 
of Cruzarfi and The case of Baby Jane Doe9 to give weight to the argument for widening 
the factors to be considered, and included the rights to be well remembered and to avoid 
unnecessary invasions of the body amongst them. Hoffman however, made clear that in 
his opinion in the present case any basis of (a life not worth living, should be rejected). 
He declared:-
"There is no question of his life being worth living or not being worth living 
because the stark reality is that Anthony Bland is not living a life at all" 10 
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Re Acts and Omissions 
None of the judges in the Court of Appeal considered the act/omission dichotomy of 
much relevance. Sir Thomas Bingham was silent on the issue; Hoffman LJ thought the 
distinction was not between acts and omissions, but between an act or omission which 
allows an existing cause to operate, and the introduction of an external agency of death", 
and in Lord Justice Butler-Sloss" view there was no unlawful act either of commission or 
omission which required the issue to be debatedl2. 
Re Bolam 
All three judges included Bolam in their argument, although, unlike their Lordships 
when the case came to the House of Lords, none considered it determinative. The 
opinions of the judges at the Court of Appeal as to the applicability oiBolam in such 
cases differed somewhat. Sir Thomas Bingham merely accepted its relevance. Lord 
Justice Butler-Sloss considered that Bolam alone was insufficient to determine issues of 
futility, and that some monitoring of the medical decision is required'3. Whilst accepting 
that a doctor's view is relevant, Hoffman L J registered concern thstBolam should be the 
test in "live or die" decisions'4. What is most significant about the views of the court of 
Appeal, is the marked reservations about the use of Bolam expressed in two of the 
judgements here, in contrast to the ready acceptance of its relevance, indeed 
determinative nature, expressed in the House of Lords. The relevance of Bolam is 
considered more fully in Chapter 5. 
Re ANH and Medical Treatment 
In the Court of Appeal, none of the judges draw any distinction between ANH and 
medical treatment, relying on the "wealth of medical expertise", (Butler-Sloss)'5, 
"Overwhelming consensus" (Bingham)i6j that ANH is included in medical treatment, but 
Hoffman does draw a clear distinction between ANH and feeding in the normal manner 
declaring the latter part of the basic obligation of care. However Hoffman also concedes 
that although ordinarily, to deny the provision of food is to cause suffering and death, 
here it is justified since AB is insensate and " his condition is such that he should be 
allowed to die" 17. Furthermore he makes it very clear that in his view the decision to 
allow the discontinuance of treatment m Bland creates no precedent for future decisions, 
and he expresses reservations by posing the question of whether it can ever be right to 
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cause the death of a human being by depriving him of food. A fuller discussion regarding 
the nature of ANH is undertaken in Chapter 6. 
In their unanimous decision, the members of the Court of Appeal base their decision 
firmly on the best interests tests of Re Fl8 with some reference to Re J^^. However, in the 
absence of a prognosis of suffering and deprivation, extend the factors to be considered 
in assessing what a patient in PVS's best interests are. They concluded that in this case 
they were best served by discontinuing AB's treatment. None, however went so far as to 
suggest that it would be unlawful to continue. 
The House of Lords 
The Decision 
Their Lordships were unanimous in their decision, but not in the details of their 
reasoning. 
Lord Goff 
In his leading judgement. Lord Goff made clear the narrow grounds of his decision 
and emphasised that it would be for Parliament and not the courts to provide the 
framework for any extension of law in this area. Lord Goff started by reiterating the law 
relating to medical treatment, in that the principle that a person of sound mind may refuse 
treatment extends the refusal of life sustaining treatment {Nancy B v Hotel - Dieu de 
Quebec^O), and also to prior refusal (subject to the rule ini?e 7^ 1) — which clarifies the 
legal position of advance directives in English law, and appears to throw doubt on the 
decision in Re 5^ 2 However, neither of these cases covers the issues in Bland where AB 
had not previously made, and could not now, make any decision as to his care, and Lord 
Goff agreed that the court must look at the best interests rule in Re F^-'i. His Lordship 
went on to observe that although there is no absolute obligation to prolong life regardless 
of circumstances, there remains nevertheless a clear distinction between taking active 
steps to bring about death, and a lawful failure to treat, the former being to "cross the 
Rubicon" of the prohibition on taking life (See Cox unreported24). 
Lord Goff agreed also that the best interests test extends to decisions to initiate or 
continue life sustaining treatment, but observed that, in these circumstances:-
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"the question is not whether it is in the best interests of the patient that he should 
die. The question is whether it is in the best interests of the patient that his life 
should be prolonged by the continuance of this form of medical treatment or 
care"25 
Lord Goff avers that put like this, the question can sensibly be answered, but even so 
he goes on to make a distinction between two categories of patient; viz. those for whom 
some balancing of benefit and burden can be carried out because they have the capacity 
to experience some quality of life thereafter, and those patients like AB, for whom no 
balancing evaluation can sensibly be carried out because the patient is permanently 
insensate. It might be lawful to withdraw treatment for the former sensate patient on the 
basis of the decision in Re J26. but vyhere the patient is unconscious, and with no hope of 
recovery, medical treatment to prolong life for no therapeutic purpose is futile and 
inappropriate. His Lordship adds that in such a case, account should be taken of the 
distress caused to relatives by the invasiveness of the treatment and indignity to the 
patient, but:-
"it is the futility of the treatment which justifies termination" 27 
Lord Goff then, upholds the decision of the lower courts in declaring withdrawal 
lawful but appears to go very much further in stating:-
"if the justification for treating a patient who lacks the capacity to consent lies in 
the fact that the treatment is provided in his best interests, it must follow that the 
treatment may, and indeed ultimately should, be discontinued when it is no 
longer in his best interests to provide it"28 
Here then is the crux of their Lordships' decision: not only may the treatment 
lawfully be discontinued, but that at some point, it must be. (See Chapter 7) 
Lord Keith ofKinkel 
Lord Keith appears to base his decision, not so much on best interests, as futility, for 
as he observes, unlike the situation mRe F, where some benefit could be conferred, or in 
Re J where continued treatment would mean a life of pain and suffering,, to a patient in 
AB's condition :-
"Whether he lives or dies is a matter of complete indifference"29 
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He therefore concluded that where a "large" body of informed and responsible 
medical opinion is to the effect that no benefit at all would be conferred by its 
continuance, and that continuance in a vegetative state with no prospect of recovery is by 
that opinion regarded as not being a benefit, there is no obligation to continue 
treatment30. 
LordLowry 
Lord Lowry, in agreeing with the decision of his colleagues, endorsed Lord Goff s 
view that once the doctors have determined that it is no longer in the patient's best 
interests to undergo further. treatment, in the absence of consent, which cannot be 
obtained, they are no longer entitled to continue treatment. His Lordship however, 
expressed concern that to a layman, the decision to discontinue artificial feeding might be 
seen as a decision to bring about AB's death because it would be in his best interests to 
die, rather than a decision that it would not be in his best interests, and therefore unlawful 
to continue treatment including artificial feeding31. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson also agreed with his colleagues that following the decision 
in Re F, the right to administer invasive medical treatment to an incompetent adult 
patient, is wholly dependent on such care being in the best interests of the patient, and 
once it is no longer in his best interests, lack of consent renders continued intervention 
unlawful, and furthermore, that unless the doctor reaches a positive conclusion that it 
would be in the patient's best interests to continue treatment, that treatment must cease32. 
His Lordship however, went further than some, at least, of his colleagues in the role 
of the doctors in determining best interests, for whereas Lords Keith and Lowry averred . 
that it is essentially for the doctors to determine best interests in accordance with a 
body/large body of informed medical opinion, but subject to the sanction of the court. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson denied the court any role other than to be satisfied that the 
doctors in charge have followed the Bolam test33. Lord Browne-Wilkinson was clearly 
uneasy at the present state of law and declared it imperative that Parliament should 
consider the issues, for whilst he acknowledged that to sanction withdrawal of treatment 
is undoubtedly within the law, it may well appear irrational that although it is lawful to 
allow AB to die slowly (albeit without suffering himself, but causing added distress to his 
family), to produce immediate death by lethal injection, would not. To emphasise his 
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concern he made it clear that the decision had been reached on "narrow legalistic grounds 
which will provide no satisfactory basis for deciding cases not identical"34, and that thus 
courts will be faced with cases where there may be slight chance of recovery or the 
patient slightly sensate. In addition, his Lordship expressed his concern at the many 
issues which fall to be addressed in the wake of Bland. 
Lord Mustill 
Lord Mustill admitted to having felt profound misgivings about almost every aspect 
of the case35 and in particular as regards the present law covering the issues. He stated:-
"By dismissing this appeal, I fear that your Lordships" House may only 
emphasise the distortion of a legal structure which is already morally and 
intellectually misshapen. Still, the law is there and we must take it as it stands"36 
Strong words indeed. 
In, agreeing with the conclusion of his colleague that the declaration of the lower 
court should stand, his Lordship did admit to some disagreement in the finer detail of 
how that conclusion had been reached. In addition he queried the acceptance to the lower 
courts that notwithstanding the decision in Malcherek'^'J the doctrine of causation 
excludes the action by AB's doctors, and also raises squarely for the first time the issue 
of scarce resources and the "best interests" of the community. However, on the latter 
issue he conceded that that issue and the concomitant issue of mercy killing a Re F or 
Parliament alone to decide, but that "until the nettle is grasped, we must struggle on with 
the existing law, imperfect as it is"38 
Lord Mustill employed a slightly different route to reach the conclusion reached by 
his colleagues, in that whilst they all relied on Re F to the extent that best interests 
provides the justification for medical treatment, and that when it was no longer in AB's 
best interests to continue treatment that justification (which is in lieu of consent) was 
vitiated. His Lordship failed to take the next step of saying that treatment should stop, but 
he averred merely that the duty to provide it had ceased and absent that duty, an omission 
is not culpable. For Lord Mustill alone was the distinction between acts and omissions 
"crucial". However in taking this line of argument, he came to a slightly different 
conclusion; He accepted that the withdrawal of treatment is an omission, and he further 
accepted that AB's best interests were not that he should die, but where he differed 
significantly from his colleagues was that whereas they conceded that AB's best interests 
lay in not continuing with invasive treatment. Lord Mustill stated baldly that the proposed 
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conduct could not be in his best interests, "for he has no best interests of any kind", and 
thus since both,his best interests in being kept alive and in having his life terminated had 
disappeared, both the justification for treatment, and the correlative duty to AB had also 
disappeared. Thus he rested his argument on the fact that since there was no longer a 
duty, an omission to perform what had previously been a duty could not be culpable: he 
was silent as to whether, in the absence of the justification to treat, treatment might 
lawfully be continued. 
In reaching this decision. Lord Mustill did however voice reservations about 
"transferring the already morally and intellectually dubious distinction between acts and 
omissions into a context where the ethical foundations of the law are already open to 
question"39, and although in the present case, he saw no difficulty in categorising the 
proposed conduct an omission, he warned that more borderline cases would inevitably 
create greater difficulties. In addition he also questioned the extension of the Bolam 
principle, and the resulting determinative role of the doctor, into an area of criminal law 
where the legality of a decision rests on ethical rather than medical opinion. 
Thus, although in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, the decision 
turned on best interests, whereas the former relies on some balancing of benefits and 
burdens to reach its conclusion, the latter denied any interests, and absent them the 
justification to continue invasive treatment. It appears then, that although their Lordships 
did uphold the legality of the proposed course of conduct to withdraw all medical 
treatment to AB, their justification was significantly different from that of the lower 
courts. However, all voiced concern at the deficiency of the present law in this area. 
It is apparent that many issues were raised which merit further exploration but four 
are of particular concern; 
1. The extension of Bland 
2. The appropriateness of Bolam in life or death decisions. See Chapter 5. 
3. Their Lordships' unquestioning acceptance that ANH is medical treatment and 
their evident reluctance to examine the difference between ANH and other forms 
of feeding. See Chapter 6. 
4. Whether Bland is good law. 
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The Issues in Bland 
Whilst their Lordships' deliberations in Bland have clarified the law within the 
narrow parameters of the judgement, in some other areas the decision has left the law less 
certain, and has raised more uncertainties. Some issues were not fully addressed, some 
issues were addressed but only to the extent of acceptance, and many issues were raised, 
which were rightly considered outside the forum of the court, and thus for which no 
answers were considered. 
In short, this landmark decision poses as many questions as it answers and 
commentators have not been slow in voicing them. 
Clarifications and Endorsements 
Substituted Judgement 
It seems unlikely that the doctrine of substituted judgement will find a place in 
English law outside the Court of Protection. It would appear that the door has been closed 
firmly against its use in the context of medical care although in a diluted sense 
consideration of what the patient would have wanted, might in some circumstances be 
included in the assessment of best interests. 
In the court of Appeal, although Butler-Sloss L J appeared to dismiss substituted 
judgement out of hand as having no place in English law other than in the Court of 
Protection, Hoffman however conceded that the best interests test includes trying "our 
honest best to do what we think he would have chosen", and further:-
"Best interests includes not only recovery of the avoidance of vain, but also a 
dignified death, and would normally include having respect paid to what seems 
most likely to have been his own views on the subject. To this extent, I think 
"substituted judgement" may be subsumed within the English concept of best 
interests"40. 
Hoffman, however was carefiil to point out that this principle excludes any positive 
act to end life which he condemns as assisting in suicide. 
In the House of Lords, whilst three of their Lordships were silent on the issue. Lords 
Mustill and Goff did address it, but their views were not absolutely identical. Lord Goff 
expressly refuted that the principle of substituted judgement is part of English law in 
relation to consent to medical treatment for incompetent adults and the test to be 
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employed is that of best interests^l. However, he then went on to say that "anything 
relevant to the application of the test (of best interests) may be taken into account", 
including apparently comfort accorded to the relatives of the patient by coming with what 
they, the relatives think the patient would have wished42. Perhaps Lord Goff allowed just 
a chink of substituted judgement here. 
Lord Mustill in a rather contradictory, and somewhat confusing passage, also 
appeared to leave room for at least the possibility of employing a surrogate where a 
sentient patient is unable to communicate a present choice, but for a patient in PVS he 
declared "the idea is simply a fiction"43. 
It seems then, that notwithstanding the slight ambivalence of Lords Goff and Mustill, 
their vehement rejection of substituted judgement outweighs their rather timid and limited 
acceptance, and that for all intents and purposes, substituted judgement has been firmly 
excluded in this area of law. 
Acts and Omissions 
Here, their Lordships' deliberations did not so much clarify uncertainty in this area, 
as highlight the current unsatisfactory state of the law, and Lord Mustill'in particular 
questioned the appropriateness of transferring the legal distinction to an area where, as he 
put it, "the ethical foundations of the law are already open to quest ion"44.brings to 
the fore the disquieting reality in that it apparently leaves us with a with a legal situation 
in which an act done with the intent to end a life is unlawful, but an omission with exactly 
the same intent is not. The position is unsustainable and merits further examination. 
In Bland, in the Court of Appeal, Hoffman was of the opinion that the distinction 
was not so much between acts and omissions as between either an actor an omission 
which allows an underlying cause to operate. Butler-Sloss averred that there was no 
unlawful act or omission, thus implying the distinction irrelevant in the circumstances. 
In the House of Lords, only Lord Mustill based his decision on the distinction 
between acts and omissions, but both at the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords 
the relevance of the dichotomy was considered, and whilst not relying on the distinction 
as an integral part of their decision, several of their Lordships emphatically averred that 
withdrawal of ANH is an omission, so implying that at least the distinction played at least 
some part in their deliberations. Lord Goff stated that in his view, withdrawal of 
treatment is clearly an omission, and as such is not unlawful unless it constitutes a breach 
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of a duty, (the accepted doctrine). He went on to say that the distinction « useful in the 
present circumstances since it can be invoked to explain how a discontinuance of life 
support can be differentiated from ending a patient's life by lethal injection. However 
Lord Goff then added that in fact it is not the distinction between act and omission which 
confers immunity, but the fact that discontinuance m&y be consistent with the doctor's 
duty, whereas a deliberate act to bring about death, for '''reasons of policy", (added 
emphasis), will not^ S. Thus Lord Goff reaffirmed the principle of immunity from liability 
in the case of an omission, save where there is a duty to act. Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
however, considered the matter in greater detail. He again confirmed the above principle 
but unlike his colleagues posited a novel defence to an omission in the face of a duty in 
the case of a doctor's duty to an incompetent patient. In his view, notwithstanding a duty 
to his patient, where the omission is to withhold treatment to which the patient because of 
his incapacity, is unable to give consent, and in the absence of any other person who can 
give consent on his behalf, that lack of consent confers a defence on a doctor, to an 
otherwise unlawful omission to act. However, it is difficult to reconcile this defence with 
the clear duty to act in the best interests of the patient where positive action is required. 
Unlike Lord Goff, his Lordship made no mention of any distinction between the liability 
of a positive act, and that of an omission in the face of a duty. However both related 
liability to the extent of the doctor's duty, on the one hand discontinuance may be the 
duty, (Goff), and on the other, in the absence of consent, the duty is to act, that is, to treat 
only when it is in the patient's best interests, (Browne-Wilkinson). Lord Goff said such 
treatment can never include a positive act to end life, but on this point Browne-Wilkinson 
was silent. Lord Mustill alone relied almost exclusively on the distinction between acts 
and omissions to sanction withdrawal, but admitted that the current state of law in this 
area is "unsatisfactory, both morally and intellectually"46j and cited the troubling case of 
R V Stone^l, a case which attached liability in manslaughter to an omission to feed, even 
where there had been no acceptance of a duty, that duty being imposed on the basis of the 
relationship between the parties, which in that case appeared to be solely that of allowing 
an infirm relative to share the defendant's home. Lord Mustill admitted that there might 
be a distinction between an omission to act which brings about a state of affairs, and one 
which merely allows it to continue, but found the dividing line between a relationship 
which incurs a duty, and one which does not, is by no means clear. His Lordship also 
compared the essential facts of Bland and R v Gibbins and Proctor^^ , and concluded that 
although ethically "miles apart", in both cases the death of a helpless individual was 
brought about by the intentional withholding of nourishment. Thus in contrast to his 
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colleagues, in Lord Mustill's view, it was because the duty to treat had come to an end 
with the abandonment of any hope of recovery, that the omission to treat (that isj 
withdrawal of ANH) no longer incurred liability. Lord Mustill's decision then rested 
squarely on the distinction between an act and an omission, but he was admittedly 
unhappy with the result, not least because in less clear cut circumstances it may be much 
harder to classify the proposed action as an omission and thus impossible to justify on 
these grounds. 
It appears then, that although the distinction between acts and omissions may be 
hard to determine in the context of medical treatment, it remains the law that absent a 
duty to act, liability accrues only to a positive act. 
The Role of The Courts 
There is general agreement by their Lordships that for the time being, a declaration 
should be sought before ANH may be withdrawn from a patient in PVS. Thus as far as 
procedure is concerned the present position is clear. What is less clear, is whether best 
interests determined by a court using its parens patriae jurisdiction in the case of a minor, 
is likely to differ significantly from best interests as determined by a doctor, and 
sanctioned by the court using its inherent jurisdiction in the case of an incompetent adult. 
The Legal Criterion of Death 
Prior to Bland, although since Malcherek^^ the implied criterion for determining 
death had been brain stem death, and the courts apparently content to accept the medical 
criterion, there had been no explicit ruling on the point. In Bland, Lord Goff stated 
categorically that since AB's brain stem had not been destroyed, he was in law aliveSO, 
and in Lord Browne-Wilkinson's vvords, "his brain stem is alive and so is he"5l. This 
ends any uncertainty as to the accepted legal criterion of death being brain stem death. 
The Right to Refuse treatment 
Post Sidaway^'^ the law has recognised the right of a competent adult to refuse 
medical treatment, regardless of the reasonableness of that decision. The law in this area 
was slightly muddied by the decisions firstly in Re 753^  and more recently in the High 
Court decision in Re 554. in Re T, a pregnant patient, who had at one time been a devout 
Jehovah's Witness signed a consent form refusing blood transfusions. However, after 
undergoing an emergency caesarean section, her condition deteriorated to the extent that 
she required an immediate transfusion, which in the light of her express refusal, her 
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doctors felt unable to give without the sanction of the court. On application by her father 
and boyfriend. Ward J gave that sanctions decision which the Court of Appeal 
subsequently upheld. Lord Donaldson agreed that prima facie every adult has the right to 
refuse medical treatment, but that that right was rebuttable either by long term incapacity, 
or by temporary incapacity due to factors such as unconsciousness, confusion or the 
effects of shock, fatigue, pain or duress, and fiirther, that it was the capacity of the patient 
at the time the decision was made which was material as to whether refusal was vitiated. 
Couched in such wide terms, this rebuttal appears to threaten the principle of self 
determination on which the right of refusal is founded. This autonomy was further 
weakened by the extraordinary decision in Re S which appeared to confirm a possible 
exception to the right of refusal identified by Lord Donaldson in Re T viz. the rebuttal of 
that right for a woman, the life of whose viable foetus is at risk. 
In Re S Sir Stephen Brown P overrode the decision made by a thirty year old patient 
in labour to refuse surgical intervention. The court held that where the lives of both the 
mother and unborn child are at risk a court may sanction such treatment notwithstanding 
the refusal of consent. Sir Stephen Brown P appears to have relied heavily on the possible 
exception, left open by Lord Donaldson in Re T, and also in passing on the American 
case of In re AC^^. Although the urgency of the decision precluded lengthy deliberation, 
(from initial application to determination taking a mere 48 minutes), the "desperate 
nature" of the circumstances appeared to have resulted in a decision which drove a coach 
and horses through the English law of consent, not least because the patient herself was 
given no opportunity to be heard, and neither were any of the vitiations highlighted mRe 
J called in aid. Thus it appeared that even absent any vitiation of refusal, where the life of 
an unborn child was at stake, albeit only as regards a viable foetus, the mother's wishes 
could be overridden with impunity. However, five months later m Bland, their Lordships, 
with the exception of Lord Lowry, clearly and decisively reiterated the right of a 
competent adult to refuse treatment, and furthermore that that right extends to the right to 
refuse life saving treatment even when the patient is suffering a disease which providing 
the present medical regime is continued, is not immediately life threatening, citing with 
approval the Canadian case of Nancy B v Hotel- Dieu de Quebec^^. 
Thus since no exceptions other than those of incapacity at the time of the decision, 
were admitted m Bland, and the possible exception of Re S was not referred to, it appears 
that for a competent adult, the right of refusal of medical treatment is restored in its 
entirety. However, although the position is clear as regards medical treatment itself, it 
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seems unlikely that public policy would allow discontinuance of basic nursing care of a 
patient unable to care for himself, and since such care undoubtedly would include 
feeding, the question as regards ANH must be debatable Chapter 6. 
Anticipatory Refusals-
In addition to clarifying the law relating to the right to refuse treatment, the House of 
Lords also endorse the Court of Appeal's view in Re T that the right to refuse medical 
treatment also extends to anticipatory decisions. In Re T the Court of Appeal had 
determined hot only that provided it is not vitiated, a competent adult has the right of 
refusal which extends to life-saving treatment, but also that provided certain conditions 
pertain, anticipatory refusals are also valid. Those conditions are similar to those which 
prevent vitiation of present consent; viz. competence on the part of the patient, the 
absence of undue influence at the time the decision is made, and a medical situation 
which correlates to that which has been anticipated. Obviously if complete exactitude of 
anticipation were the criterion of a valid refusal, few if any would pass the test, so 
robbing the patient of his right to refuse and thus the Court of Appeal made clear that 
provided the patient is made aware of the consequences of refusal of treatment in the type 
of situation anticipated, refusal will not be vitiated for want of specific medical details. 
In Bland, only Lords Mustill, Goff and Keith addressed this particular issue. Lord 
Goff cited with approval Re T, but observed that especial care must be taken to ensure 
that the prior refusal is still properly applicable,57 and Lord Keith endorsed this view, 
adding that a person is "at complete liberty to decline to undergo treatment",58 and that 
choice extends to prior refiisal, provided that he has given "clear instructions" relating to 
the eventuality. It seems then that the legality of prior refusal can no longer be in any 
doubt and in recognition of this the Government asked the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics to look at, inter alia, the practicalities of documentary 
advance directives.59 The Law Commission has included a draft Bill, which contains 
provision for advance directives, in its recent recommendations regarding medical 
treatment for the mentally incapacitated^O. The acceptance of advance directives as 
legally binding has been affirmed in the first instance decision in Re C (Refusal of 
medical treatment) [1994 in which the High Court upheld the right of an adult 
schizophrenic to make a refusal as regards amputation, at the present, and against 
possible amputation at any time in the fiiture. 
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Notwithstanding the above clarifications, the decision in Bland has left some areas 
of the law in even greater uncertainty. Quite apart from these legal uncertainties, the 
decision in Bland, has brought to the forefront social and ethical issues which cry out for 
wider and deeper discussion in an arena outside that of the courts of law. However, here 
it is intended to concentrate on only four areas of concerns. Firstly, the extension of 
Bland, secondly, the relevance of Bolam in the determination of best interests, thirdly, 
the legal and moral significance of the distinction between artificial nutrition and basic 
care, and lastly, whether the decision in Bland is correct. 
The Extension of Bland 
In the leading judgement in The House of Lords, Lord Goff clearly indicated the 
narrow parameters of the Judgement, arid Lords Mustill and Browne-Wilkinson went 
further in doubting the applicability of Bland in any other case. However, although the 
expected flurry of cases reaching the Courts has not materialised, the few cases which 
have arisen have illustrated some of the shortcoming in Bland, and have belied the 
narrowness of that decision. In particular, the worrying case of Frenchay^'^ has 
highlighted fears of a much wider application of Bland than their Lordships had appeared 
to anticipate. The case raised two major concerns. Firstly there was some doubt as to the 
diagnosis of PVS, and secondly there seemed an unnecessary haste in making the 
decision. In Frenchay, the Court was asked, as a matter of urgency to sanction the non-
replacement of a gastrostomy tube used to deliver ANH to a patient who was purported to 
be in PVS, after it had become dislodged. Apparently it was not medically practical 
merely to reinsert the tube and replacement therefore would have required a surgical 
operation. The doctors decided that this would not be in the patient's best interests and 
sought a declaration from the Court to this effect. The Application was opposed on the 
grounds that the diagnosis was uncertain, and that the procedures set out in Bland had not 
been followed in that the apparent urgency of the application had precluded a full 
investigation of the facts and opportunity to obtain independent medical opinions. 
The patient S had suffered from oxygen starvation after he had taken a massive 
overdose of drugs. He had never regained consciousness and remained comatose. As 
regards the diagnosis of PVS, there must have been at least some doubt since although S 
was kept heavily sedated, he still exhibited some degree of sentience it not cognisance. 
Furthermore as evidence of some volitional behaviour, it was conceded that he might 
have pulled out the gastrostomy tube himself However, the majority medical opinion was 
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that he was in PVS, although obviously in not such an extreme condition as Tony Bland. 
The extreme urgency of the application is open to question, for when the tube became 
dislodged, even though simple replacement apparently was not a viable option, other 
methods of ANH, or at least hydration must have been possible, as an interim measure to 
enable further enquiry. In Bland it was made clear that the decision rested on the extreme 
condition of AB, and doubts were expressed as to whether a similar judgement would be 
made in less severe cases of PVS. The Court nevertheless sanctioned the non-
replacement of the tube, and S died some days later. Since the House of Lords expressly 
limited Bland to like circumstances it is difficult to see ho-wBland and Frenchay are on 
all fours. Frenchay cannot be merely an application Bland— it must be an extension. 
As the first directly related case to come before the English courts in the wake oiBland, 
Frenchay shows such a significant departure from the narrow parameters of that case, 
that there must be cause for concern. If we can see being diluted to encompass less 
extreme cases of PVS, where there is some, if only minimal consciousness, the alarm 
belle surely must alert us to the possibility of Bland being extended to cover any 
incompetent patient in receipt of ANH whose life is considered, (by doctors), to be "not 
worth living". 
The Official Solicitor has issued a practice note with regard to applications to 
withdraw medical treatment from patients in PVS, which requires, inter alia that two 
independent medical reports must be made available to ensure a correct diagnosis, that 
the views of the relatives should be sought, and that there should be an adequate 
opportunity for the Official Solicitor to make a full investigation prior to the hearing63. 
However, the two further cases which have reached the courts appear to demand an 
unequivocal diagnosis of PVS as a prerequisite for withdrawal of treatment from a 
comatose patient. In Re G64 the court was asked to sanction the removal of a 
gastrostomy tube from a patient who, eighteen months earlier had suffered severe brain 
injury. In contrast to Frenchay, here, all the medical evidence supported the view that G 
was in PVS. The issue at. point was whether the view of a close relative, (here G's 
mother), that the withdrawal of artificial feeding was not in the patient's best interests, 
could outweigh that of doctor in charge, that it was. Sir Stephen Brown P held that since 
the doctor had taken account of the views of the relatives, (including G's wife and 
mother), in accordance with the BMA guidelines for the treatment of patients in PVS,65 
the Consultant Surgeon's decision to withdraw treatment could not be vetoed by those 
views. 
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In the second of the two cases, Swindon and Marlborough NHS Trust v 566 the 
question arose as to whether to operate on a patient in PVS to reinsert a gastrostomy tube 
which had become dislodged. The diagnosis of PVS was in no doubt. The Court held that 
in treating a patient in PVS, a doctor acting in accordance with the B M A guidelines, will 
satisfy the Bolam test, and may continue to give such treatment as is appropriate, and 
furthermore, may discontinue life-sustaining measures when to do so would be in 
accordance with good medical practice. Thus it appears that, subject to Bolam, the 
doctor's decision is to be determinate. For further discussion on this point see Chapter 5. 
It seems then, that notwithstandingFre«c/?ay, the courts will require an unequivocal 
diagnosis of PVS, but that nevertheless there may be some "emergency cases", where 
time is of the essence, where the full requirements of the Practice Statement may yet be 
circumvented. 
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The Bolam Test derives from the direction given by McNair J. to the jury in the case 
of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee^ to determine the standard of the 
duty of care owed to a patient by his doctor. It dictates that to defeat a claim for medical 
negligence, the medical practitioner must show that at the relevant time, some, however 
minor, responsible body of medical opinion, would have considered the given treatment 
appropriate. It is based on the recognition that there is ample scope for genuine 
differences of opinion between medical practitioners in the provision of suitable medical 
treatment. However, this legal standard, resting as it does solely on medical opinion, has 
engendered no little criticism in legal debate. 
The issue at point in Bolam was whether a doctor had acted negligently2. It is 
important to note however, that the Bolam test is not confined to medical care alone, 
{Gold V Haringey Health Authority)^, but is the general test of negligence relevant to the 
duty of care owed by a person professing some special skill, and who thus owes a 
particular standard of care, towards those persons for whom he has undertaken that duty. 
In the medical context, Bolam defines a standard of care as adjudged by the medical 
profession alone below which standard negligence may be imputed. As such, the Bolam 
principle has been guarded jealously by the medical profession to absolve a defendant 
from a finding of negligence merely because he has acted in accordance with some 
medical practice accepted by some, albeit responsible, body of medical opinion. That 
absolution has been accepted by the courts; Lord Scarman for example has observed that 
the Bolam test :-
"leaves the determination of a Legal duty to the judgement of doctors" 
(Sidaway)^ 
Nevertheless, the Bolam test has long been established as the test for medical 
negligence, and although in Bolam itself, the issue lay in the standard of care to be 
applied in determining medical treatment, the House of Lords has both approved the test 
again as regards treatment (Whitehouse v Jordan)^, and also as regards diagnosis, 
(Maynard v West Midlands RHA^), and disclosure of information, (Sidaway)'^. 
More recently, in a rather curious decision, the Court of Appeal added issues of 
causation to that list (Bolitho)^. At first sight then, it does appear that since the mid-
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eighties at any rate, the position in English law has been that as regards medical decisions 
across the board, providing that it can be supported by at least some responsible body of 
medical opinion, apparently however minor, a decision of the medical practitioner in 
charge cannot legally be challenged. However, notwithstanding the apparent ubiquitous 
acceptance of Bolam as the test for professional negligence, in more recent years, judicial 
opinion has expressed increasing reservations as to its determinative nature, and that 
opinion appears to have effected a growing groundswell away from Bolam. The question 
must be raised now whether ^o/am is still the appropriate test in all, or any of the above 
areas, and for the present purposes, whether it should play any part in the best interests 
test, particularly where those interests may lie in the discontinuance of treatment. 
The essential feature of the Bolam test is that it is a test for determining negligence, 
and as such is the measure by which a breach of duty can be established. However, 
although Bolam became the test for negligence over an increasing sphere of influence, 
the seeds of caution were sowed relatively early in this development. A brief examination 
of the landmark case of Sidaway illustrates the beginnings of dissent as to the 
applicability of Bolam, even in the field of negligence alone, to all aspects of medical 
liability. 
In Sidaway9 the House of Lords considered whether the Bolam test should be 
applied in cases of alleged negligence in providing sufficient inforrhation as regards 
proposed medical treatment However, notwithstanding the unanimous decision, there was 
far from unanimity as regards the role of Bolam, and examination of their Lordships' 
judgements reveal significant divergence of opinion. Lord Diplock considered5o/fl/M the 
sole test, Lord Bridge, with whom Lord Keith agreed, considered it slightly less 
determinative, (to be decided primarily on the basis of medical evidence). Lord 
Templeman avoided discussing Bolam as such whilst accepting the relevance of current 
medical practice, seemed even less inclined to allow medical opinion to be the arbiter, 
and Lord Scarman rejected Bolam almost entirely as regards disclosure. He declared:-
" I . am satisfied that the trial judge and the Court of Appeal erred in law in 
holding that in a case where the alleged negligence is a failure to warn the 
patient of a risk inherent in the treatment proposed, the Bolam test is to be 
applied. In my view, the question whether or not the omission constitutes a 
breach of the doctor's duty of care towards his patient is to be determined not 
exclusively by reference to the current state of responsible and competent 
professional opinion and practice at the time, though both are of course relevant 
considerations" 10 
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With reference to accepting Bolam as the appropriate test, he went on to say:-
"The implications of this view are disturbing. It leaves the determination of a 
legal duty to the judgement of doctors." 11 
His Lordship preferred to draw on the transatlantic concept of the "prudent patient", 
as expounded in Canterbury v Spence^'^ , and although he accepted that the doctrine of 
informed consent as such has at present no place in English law, to all intents and 
purposes, he advocated just that, and in doing so averred that it is for a court to determine 
whether a doctor has breached his duty, rather than concurrence or not with current 
medical opinion. 
In contrast. Lord Diplock had no hesitation in relying as exclusively on Bolam in 
these circumstances as in those of treatment or diagnosis. He declared in Sidaway:-
"no convincing reason has in my view been advanced before your Lordships 
that would justify treating the Bolam test as doing anything less than laying 
down a principle of English law that is comprehensive and applicable to every 
aspect of the duty of care owed by a doctor to his patient in the exercise of his 
healing functions as respects that patient" 13 
Furthermore, he firmly rejected any reliance on the doctrine of informed consent. 
Lords Bridge and Keith concurred, and Lord Bridge refuted Lord Scarman's assertion as 
to the determinative nature of medical opinion if Bolam is accepted as the appropriate 
test. He stated:-
"whether nondisclosure in a particular case should be condemned as a breach of 
duty of care is an issue to be decided primarily on the basis of expert medical 
evidence, applying the Bolam test, but I do not see that this approach involves 
the necessity to hand over to the medical profession the entire question of the 
scope of the duty of disclosure" 14 
Since Lord Templeman used as his yardstick the "overriding duty to have regard to 
the best interests of the patient" 15, he appeared to have some reservations as to the 
determinative nature of a body of medical opinion. 
It seems then, that as early as 1985 there was significant disagreement as to the 
blanket application of Bolam to cover all aspects of a doctor's duty of care. Furthermore, 
Lord Diplock, whilst making clear that no distinction is to be made between differing 
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categories of therapeutic care, may have intentionally or unwittingly placed a rider on 
Bolam, which may have implications for the present issue when he declared:-
"no convincing reason has been advanced... that would justify treating the 
Bolam test as doing anything less than laying down a general principle of 
English law that is comprehensive and applicable to every aspect of the duty of 
care owed by a doctor to his patient in the exercise of his healing functions as 
respects that patient"[added emphasis] 16 
Here then, whilst supporting the Bolam test as a general principle, his Lordship does 
add the phrase highlighted, which would significantly qualify the principle as regards 
measures which do not fall into that category, and which therefore would exclude 
decisions of discontinuance of treatment in situations where healing is not an option. 
However, this advances the argument little further, since in Sidaway the issue was still 
one of a breach of the duty of care, whereas the discontinuance of medical treatment 
clearly goes far beyond mere negligence. Later cases throw more light, but nonetheless it 
appears that the use of Bolam could have been curtailed at this early juncture so as to 
devolve decision making other than for therapeutic treatment, into a wider forum than 
medical opinion alone. However, since the House of Lords in Sidaway endorsed Bolam, it 
has remained the test, but it has come under increasing criticism as its inappropriateness 
has been explored in later cases, both in the English courts and in other common law 
jurisdictions. 
In Rogers v Whitaker^'^ in 1992 the High Court of Australia resoundingly refuted 
Bolam as the test for negligence as regards disclosure. Both at the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales, and in the High Court of Australia, the decision by the House of Lords in 
Sidaway that the Bolam test extends to disclosure, was deemed wrong. The Court 
declared:-
"In Australia, it has been accepted that the standard of care observed by a person 
with some special skill or competence is that of the ordinary skilled person 
exercising and professing to have that special skill, but that standard is not 
determined solely, or even primarily by reference to the practice followed or 
supported by a responsible body of opinion in the relevant profession or 
trade" 18 
Thus, the court struck at the very root of Bolam as a general principle. However it 
must be noted that the nature of consent in Australia bears heavily on the duty to disclose. 
Even so, Judge Gauldren went even further. 
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She said:-
"even in the area of diagnosis and treatment there is, in my view, no legal basis 
for limiting liability in terms of the rule known as 'The Bolam Test' " 
and, 
" the Bolam test may be a convenient statement of the approach dictated by the 
state of evidence in some cases, As such, it may have some utility as a rule of 
thumb in some jury cases, but it can serve no other useful function."19 
So, it would seem that in Australia, the appropriateness of Bolam in the field of 
medical negligence has not only been challenged and found wanting, but has actively 
been discarded. How then did the house of Lords so enthusiastically embrace it mRe F 
and consequentially in Bland, and do later cases show further advance, or retreat into its 
more apposite arena? 
The Transposition of Bolam 
Bolam inReF 
In English law then, the Bolam test has long been the unchallenged standard by 
which medical negligence is judged, but in recent years it has been employed in cases 
where the issues extended far beyond that of tortious liability. It appears that the scope 
was first extended in the case of Re F. There, in the course of deliberating whether an 
incompetent female patient should undergo sterilisation, the House of Lords considered 
the circumstances in which the prima facie tortious liability for non-consensual medical 
treatment is displaced. However, it was Scott-Baker J set the ball rolling in the judgement 
at first instance when, as regards the liability of doctors when treating an incompetent 
adult patient, he opined:-
"I do not think they are liable in battery where they are acting in good faith and 
reasonably in the best interests of their patients. I doubt whether the test is very 
different from that for negligence"20 
For this declaration he was taken to task by all three judges in the Court of Appeal, 
none of whom thought Bolam alone an adequate test for determining whether medical 
treatment is in a patient's best interests, but equally none denied.5o/(3/w a role at all. In his 
leading judgement Lord Donaldson declared:-
56 
Chapters The Relevance Of Bolam 
"...just as the law and the courts rightly pay great, but not decisive, regard to 
accepted professional wisdom in relation to the duty of care in the law of 
medical negligence... so they equally would have regard to such wisdom in 
relations to decisions whether or not, and how to treat incompetent patients in 
the context of the law of trespass to the persons"21 
Here then his Lordship appeared to accept medical opinion as relevant to liability 
both in trespass and negligence, but denied its determination of either: a significant 
departure from Bolam even as regards negligence. 
Neill L . J . also voiced reservations; whilst accepting that non-consensual treatment 
may properly be carried out in circumstances of necessity, his Lordship considered 
Bolam alone an insufficiently stringent test to determine necessity, (and thus preclude an 
action in trespass), but that in this context necessity should be determined by 
"that which the general body of medical opinion in the particular speciality 
would consider to be in the best interests of the patient"22 
So here, the Bolam "responsible body", is displaced by "the general body", a 
somewhat imprecise criteria given the diversity of valid medical opinion, or where such 
opinion is divided into equal, but opposing schools of thought. However, it is clear that 
this test is considerably more demanding than Bolam, but still leaves decision making in 
the hands of the medical profession. 
Butler-Sloss L . J . , agreed with Neill L . J . that the negligence test oiBolam is too 
wide and she endorsed her colleague's narrower test, and furthermore, in particular 
categories of treatment, such as sterilisation, she claimed the final arbiter should be the 
court. 
Thus it seems there was unanimity in the Court of Appeal as to the inadequacy of the 
Bolam test, but no outright rejection of it either, their Lordship's preferring the stricter, 
but still medically determined test of "the general body of medical opinion" to determine 
best interests. Of course in Re F, the issue of withdrawal of treatment was not addressed, 
but it is submitted that as are those in sterilisation, the issues are far wider than the merely 
medical, and that therefore even the "general body of medical opinion" test is 
insufficient. However, when the case of Re F reached the House of Lords, Lords Bridge, 
Brandon, Griffiths, Goff and Jauncy resiled from the court of Appeal's call for a stricter 
test for trespass than for negligence. 
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Lord Bridge rejected any differentiation between the tests for negligence and 
trespass. He reasoned that the carers of patients lacking the ability to consent would be 
placed in a dilemma that if they treat, they may be held guilty of trespass, and if they fail 
to treat, of negligence. Thus his Lordship held that those who undertake treatment of 
incompetent or unconscious patients should be judged by "one standard, not two" and, 
provided that have acted in accordance with the Bolam test, 
"they should be immune from liability in trespass, just as they are immune from 
liability in negligence" 23 
Lord Brandon also refused to deny Bolam as the sole test. In a rather curious 
reasoning his Lordship appeared to equate best interests with compliance yiiih Bolam in 
his view, "in order to be lawful, treatment given to incompetent adults must be in their 
best interests" but added:-
"If doctor's were to be required... to apply some test more stringent than the 
Bolam test,.the result would be that such adults would, in some circumstances at 
least, be deprived of the benefit of medical treatment which adults competent to 
give consent would enjoy"24 
Lord Griffiths agreed that the duty of a doctor is to give such treatment as he 
considers in the best interests of his patient, "and the standard of care required is that laid 
down by 5o/awj"25 
Lord Goff also agreed that best interests again must be the test, but he too added 
Bolam to the decision making formula, although he conceded that in practice there may 
be occasions when inter-disciplinary team will participate in the decision making 
process.26 
Lord Jauncy appeared to endorse his colleagues' views, but in breaking down 
medical care into the four component stages of diagnosis, whether to treat, how to treat 
and actually treating, he appears to have muddied the waters somewhat. With reference to 
those treating the patient he said:-
"However, if such persons take the decision in relation to the second and third 
stages solely in his best interests and if their approach to, and execution of, all 
four stages is such that would be adopted by a responsible body of medical 
opinion, they will have done all that is required of them and their actions will 
not be subject to challenge as being unlawful"27 
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It is difficult to reconcile these two assertions, since he both denied and endorsed the 
use of Bolam in the same breath, for whereas, "solely" excludes any other considerations, 
the implication of the latter assertion, surely is that best interests must be governed, not 
by what the physician in charge considers to be in his patient's best interests, but whether 
a responsible body of appropriate medical opinion would concur. However, if the 
implication is, that if the proposed treatment is in the patient's best interest, then a 
fortiori, some responsible body of relevant medical opinion would consider it 
appropriate, and the use of Bolam is merely superfluous. 
Here then, in Re F, all three members of the Court of Appeal considered that the 
Bolam test was insufficiently stringent for deciding whether treatment is in a patient's 
best interests, but in contrast the members of the House of Lords, with the possible 
exception of Lord Jauncy, held that it is. The decision in Re F, set the benchmark of best 
interests to determine medical treatment of the adult incompetent patient, but having done 
so with the inclusion of the Bolam test, when, in Bland (and subsequently in Frenchay^^) 
the issue turned from whether, and how to treat, to whether to discontinue treatment, their 
Lordships employed the same formula, that is, best interests in accordance with the 
Bolam principle, although as examined later, the Court of Appeal expressed grave 
reservations as to the relevance of Bolam. 
Bland and Bolam 
At first sight the decision in Bland appears wholeheartedly to endorse the 
juxtaposition of the Boldm test and best interests, however, a closer examination of the 
deliberations in Bland reveals a clear discrepancy of view between the Court of Appeal 
and the House of Lords as regards the role of Bolam. 
In the Court of Appeal, Butler-Sloss L . J . clearly expressed reservations regarding 
the adequacy of Bolam alone. In considering the extent of the duty of care of a doctor to a 
patient in PVS, and accepting that the medical team caring for Anthony Bland were of the 
opinion that his best interests lay in the disconfinuance of all medical treatment, she said:-
"The formulation of the duty of care within the Bolam test may not by itself be 
an adequate basis for this grave decision which requires more than the decision 
as to the uselessness of future treatment. The principle of best interest of an 
incompetent patient in the present circumstances encompasses wider 
considerations including some degree of monitoring of medical decisions"29 
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Hoffman L . J . also took the view that the decision whether to withdraw treatment 
should not be decided by reference to the views of the medical opinion alone, but rather 
complicated his judgement by emphasising that the issue for the court was declaratory as 
to proposed future treatment, rather than judgmental of past conduct. He said:-
"If the issue was whether such an act had given rise to civil or criminal liability, 
the fact that the doctor had acted in accordance with responsible professional 
opinion would usually be determinative. But in this case the plaintiff hospital 
trust is seeking the opinion of the court as to whether fiiture conduct will be 
lawful. It has invited the court to decide whether... the termination of life-
support would be justified as being in the best interests of the patient. This is a 
purely legal (or moral), decision which does not require any medical expertise 
and is therefore appropriately made by the court"30 
Whether it can be taken that it is the past/future issue, the issue of withdrawal, or 
both, which makes Bolam insufficient is not absolutely clear and thus whether, had the 
doctors in charge of Anthony Bland terminated treatment without asking for court 
approval, the test for liability in trespass or negligence would have been that of Bolam. 
However, what is clear, is that for Hoffman, in the determination of best interests when 
those interests may lie in the withdrawal of treatment, Bolam has no relevance. 
In the House of Lords, it fell to Lords Keith, Goff, Lowry, Browne-Wilkinson and 
Mustill to consider the issue. Lord Keith, put a slightly different twist on, (and thus 
narrow), Bolam in circumstances where the issue is withdrawal of treatment. Although 
his Lordship cited 5o/a/w, he altered the principle substantially by requiring"a large body 
of informed and responsible medical opinion" to approve withdrawal, [added 
emphasis]3i 
In his leading judgement, Lord Goff appeared to suffer no such scruples, he firmly 
reiterated the stance taken by his colleagues in Re F, that Bolam is as appropriate in 
decisions either to initiate or withdraw medical treatment, as in those of any other form of 
treatment. However, his Lordship then went on to add the rider that "it is to be expected 
that guidance will be provided for the profession", and that this guidance was to be found 
in the safeguards set out by the ethics committee of the BMA contained in the discussion 
document "Treatment of Patients in Persistent Vegetative State"32. In his Lordship's 
words:-
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[the] "study of this document, left me in no doubt that if a doctor treating a P V S 
patient acts in accordance with the practice now being evolved by the medical 
ethics committee of the British Medical Association, he will be acting with the 
benefit of guidance from a responsible and competent body of relevant 
professional opinion, as required by the Bolam test". 33 
So here again whilst still paying lip service to theBolam principle, the test itself was 
shifted from the wide "a responsible body of opinion", to the much more explicit, and 
thus narrower, body of opinion which formulated the B M A guidelines. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson had no inclination to curtail the Bolam test, for not only 
was he adamant that where a responsible doctor acting in accordance with theBolam test, 
had come to a reasonable conclusion that continuation of treatment was no longer in his 
patient's best interests, that treatment must cease34, but even more alarmingly, on 
application to a court on the lawfulness of withdrawal in those circumstances, the court's 
only concern would be the reasonableness of the decision and its compliance with Bolam 
.35 (added emphasis). 
However he, like Lord Goff made the obvious point that compliance with the B M A 
Ethical Committee's proposed guidelines, would satisfy Bolam without making clear 
whether the guidelines would be a legal requirement, or whether compliance withBolam 
alone would be sufficient. I f the former is the case, the test is substantially narrowed and, 
Bolam is again superfluous. 
This leaves Lord Mustill, who alone of their Lordships clearly expressed 
reservations as to the "application of the principle of civil liability in negligence laid 
down in Bolam to decisions of best interests in a field dominated by the criminal law"36. 
In his opinion, beyond the areas of diagnosis, prognosis and medical appraisal, the issue 
is ethical rather than medical and "there is no reason in logic why on such decisions, the 
opinions of doctors should be decisive". He added that had the decision of the court 
rested on the Bolam test he would have wished to consider the matter further37. 
Bolam in Frenchay 
Notwithstanding significant factual differences from those in Bland, the court in 
Frenchay,^^ applied Bland. The Court of Appeal in Frenchay, had been asked to uphold 
a High Court declaration sanctioning the non-replacement of a gastrostomy tube which 
had become dislodged from the stomach of a comatose young man. Despite some signs 
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of "glimmering awareness", the patient was nonetheless diagnosed as being in a PVS. 
The Court of Appeal agreed to the doctors' request, but in doing so. Sir Thomas Bingham 
MR. made some observations as to the relevance of Bolam, and in reserving ultimate 
decision making for the court he stated:-. 
"It is important that there should not be a belief that what a doctor says is the 
patient's best interest is the patient's best interests"39 
However this robust declaration loses much of its force since he then conceded that 
if the court held a view contrary to that of the doctors, their position would be untenable 
in that in the instant case they would be obliged to perform a operation on the patient 
which was against their professional judgement. He did however affirm that there might 
be cases where there might be "real doubt" about the correctness of the medical opinion, 
and where the court might therefore demand such action. Notwithstanding this caveat, 
Julie Stone is of the opinion that far from retreating from Bolam, Frenchay extends its 
use even beyond Bland's narrow parameters.40 
It is interesting to note that in T v 7^1, a case predating both Re F and Bland on facts 
not dissimilar to those in Re F, Wood J. emasculated Bolam by posing the question, that 
in such circumstances, what does medical practice demand? He later refined this further 
by narrowing it to the demands of "good medical practice", a test much more aligned to 
the later views of Neill L . J . in Re F, "the general body of medical opinion", and Lord 
Keith in Bland, "a large body of medical opinion" 
Commentators have shown concern at the apparent transfer of a test for negligence 
into the wider fields of trespass and/or criminal law. Kennedy and Grubb have 
commentated on the changing approach taken by the courts in several notable cases over 
the last few years and have noted the significant shift away from Bolam in other 
jurisdictions, in contrast to the cautious approach taken by the English courts42 43 44. 
They maintain that the reluctance by the Law Lords , to require a stricter test Xh&nBolam, 
stems as much from the desire to employ the same test for both the doctor's duty of care 
to his patient, as for his defence against non-consensual treatment of him: the "one 
standard not two", of Lord Bridge's judgement mRe F. Both Kennedy and Grubb, take 
issue with the whole premise of Bolam in that, under Bolam what should be merely a 
matter of medical evidence has become determinative. 
Commenting on Rogers v Whitaker,'^^ Grubb contends that the English courts have 
"taken Bolam literally and hence too far"46, in that just as Bolam is not determinative in 
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Other spheres of professional competence, neither should it be in the medical arena. In 
particular, Grubb denies Bolam any role in areas other than those pertaining to medical 
judgement. With regard to the approach taken by the Court of Appeal mBolitho^^, Grubb 
reiterates this view that Bolam should be confined to questions of a purely medical 
nature, and furthermore even then it is the reasonableness of the doctor's decision which 
is determinative. Bolitho involved an allegation of negligence in that a Paediatric 
Registrar had failed to attend a two year old with severe breathing problems. The claim 
was that had the Registrar attended the child, she would have intubated him, and 
therefore he would not have died. The question arose as to the relevance of Bolam in this 
issue of causation. The decision was not unanimous, but the majority held that the court 
should rely on expert rriedical opinion. Simon-Browne L . J . dissenting, declared Bolam 
inappropriate. Grubb observes that the English courts appear to have lost sight of the 
distinction between a case which raises a question of professional practice, and one which 
does not. Only in the former case does Bolam have any place, and even there is subject to 
the test of whether the doctor's conduct is reasonable. The latter case is subject only to 
the general rule of reasonableness. Grubb, however would not go so far as Dillon L . J. in 
Boiitho and aver that only "Wednesbury unreasonableness" provides proof of negligence. 
Whilst adding little to the determinative nature of medical opinion, the recent case of 
Defreitas v O 'Brien and Another^^ adds a further gloss to Bolam, in that the court held 
that a small number of specialist doctors are sufficient to satisfy "the responsible body of 
medical opinion" required by Bolam. 
It is interesting to note that the Australian courts have already upgraded the 
requirement of reasonableness, and given Bolam only a back seat in the finding of 
medical negligence. In the case of Darly v Shale,^'^ Wood J held that as regards 
professional practices, although failure to comply with current practice in the particular 
field will amount to negligence, the converse does "not necessarily follow", and the test 
to be applied is that of reasonableness or otherwise of the action taking into account all 
known risks. 
Much has been written as to the extent and parameters of Bolam, but in Re F, the 
House of Lords extended the boundaries of the test in an entirely new direction when it 
transported what is essentially, and arguably should remain, a test for negligence into the 
realms of the criminal law. Given the level of expertise required to make a sensible 
medical judgement, whereas it may be right, and probably inevitable, that the standard of 
care pertaining to medical negligence should be determined largely, even if not solely, by 
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responsible medical practice or opinion, where the action to be considered has moved 
away from the purely therapeutic, there are strong arguments to suggest that medical 
opinion should not be the determinative arbiter. There is a groundswell of opinion to the 
effect that Bolam should be confined to issues of negligence relating to treatment and 
diagnosis only, and furthermore that a test of reasonableness should be reintroduced to 
even these areas. 
The great problem in transferring 5o/a/w outside tortious liability, is that where the 
issues at hand are not purely medical, current medical practice may, or may not, have 
some relevance, but it must be accepted that criminal culpability must be left to the 
lawyers, and in the realms of ethical debate, the opinion of the medical profession should 
carry no more weight than that of any other professional body. 
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6. The Withdrawal Of Artificial Nutrition 
And Hydration. 
Is it Treatment or Basic Care? 
The withdrawal of any life support is ethically both controversial and complex, but 
the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) is an especially emotive 
subject. It is of course not uncommon for healthcare providers to make decisions as to the 
withdrawal of artificial aids to life support. The debate over the withdrawal of life-
support has now focused on the withholding or withdrawal of ANH. Much has been 
made of the difference between withdrawing ANH as distinct from other life-supporting 
measures. Whilst the withdrawal of certain types of medical care, in appropriate 
circumstances, is perceived as justified, some view the termination of ANH as being in a 
special category, which requires wider considerations. For whereas most people are 
prepared to accept the discontinuation of the more technical interventions of life support, 
for the lay person in particular, ANH may be seen as basic care, the withdrawal of which 
wil l leave the patient to "die of thirst", or "starve to death", and many clinicians too may 
feel an unease at the distinction between "artificial" and other means of feeding. Two 
separate issues must be addressed. Firstly, is there some difference in principle between 
the withdrawal of ANH and other life supporting measures, and secondly, i f there is, on 
what principle i f any, may ANH be withdrawn? In addition, for the present purposes we 
must examine whether the general legal principles are satisfactory as regards patients in 
PVS. 
Before examining the moral, legal or ethical arguments to support or refute any 
difference, it is useful to consider briefly the adverse effects of either providing, or 
withdrawing the various methods of ANH. Here, it is not proposed to detail the means by 
which artificial nutrition may be administered. Suffice it to say that those means vary in 
complexity, all are invasive, all cause some discomfort to a sentient patient and all may, 
and it continued for any length of time invariably wil l , lead to further medical 
complications. Furthermore, since none is permanent, i f ANH is needed for any length of 
time, the means of delivery wil l require renewing and the initial procedure repeated. 
. Both physicians and commentators have debated the level of pain or discomfort felt 
when ANH is withdrawn. There is evidence to show, that in some circumstances at any 
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rate, there is a remarkable lack of discomfort'. What is clear however, is that the 
gruesome picture painted by one of the dissenting judges the American case ofBrophy^ 
is a great exaggeration. (Here the Judge predicted a lengthy and "a painful and gruesome 
death", whereas in fact the patient died peacefully several days after his nasogastric tube 
had been removed). Ahronheim and Rose Gasner quote sources of evidence which 
indicate that for many categories of semi-comatose patients, dehydration results in rapid, 
but painless further depression of consciousness and that such patients feel no thirst and 
that in fact their bodies produce an increased amount of natural analgesia3. Of course 
none of this is relevant for a patient in PVS. 
The starting point for any treatment decisions must be the premise that a competent 
patient has the right to refuse any or all medical treatment, including any means of 
nutrition, and therefore, it is only as regards the incompetent patient, (or following dicta 
in Re r 4 a n d Bland, one who has made no relevant advance directive), that the following 
examination applies. Furthermore, for the present purposes, the discussion will 
concentrate on vvithdrawal from the comatose patient, although some of the principles 
relied upon have been developed in decisions relating to the incompetent, but conscious 
patient. 
As regards the incompetent there is a general duty owed by a carer to his charge, 
which includes a duty to provide such basic care as will maintain the health and welfare 
of that person and thus includes inter alia, the provision of food and drink. For an 
incompetent patient in hospital this duty is owed by the medical and nursing staff who are 
charged with his care, but for the doctor in charge, this primary duty is overlaid with a 
duty to render such medical treatment as is in the patient's best interests (Re F^). A 
doctor then, has a double duty of care: to furnish basic care, and to treat his patient. 
Largely because of technical advances which have made possible the prolongation 
of life for many gravely i l l patients, it has been increasingly accepted, both legally and 
morally, that whilst continuing to furnish basic nursing care, treatment which is of no 
benefit to the patient may be withheld or withdrawn. Professor Jennett Has recently 
argued that treatment may be limited for one of three reasons: Firstly, in cases of futility, 
where life would not be prolonged, secondly, where life might be prolonged for a short 
period, but the burdens to the patient in so doing would outweigh the benefits, and, 
thirdly, where the life to be prolonged would be of such poor quality as to be considered 
of no benefit to the patient. He includes in this third category patients in PVS6. However 
although treatment may be withdrawn, the duty to furnish basic care continues either until 
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the death of the patient or until the patient recovers or regains competence and refuses 
such care. It is a moot point however whether a patient may ever refuse basic care whilst 
remaining a patient and thus subject to the carers' duty of care, since it is possible to 
argue a right on behalf of the carer not to have his care impugned. Obviously in the vast 
majority of cases "basic care" includes feeding and can readily be distinguished from 
medical treatment, but when the method of feeding is other than by mouth do we need to 
maintain a distinction, or can ANH properly be included as part of medical treatment 
rather than of basic care? 
Medical Opinion 
It might be supposed that the distinction between natural and artificial means of 
nutrition is clear: feeding by mouth being part of basic nursing care, by any other means 
part of medical treatment. However, the perception of whether the procedure is feeding or 
treatment, may depend on whether the patient is being cared for at home or in a hospital 
environment. What is clear is that the medical profession as a whole has no hesitation in 
classifying ANH as part of overall medical treatment, and thus, the considerations for the 
withdrawal of ANH or any other type of artificial life-sustaining treatment might be 
assumed to be one and the same. However, even among medical practitioners there are 
differences of opinion as to the role of ANH, and it is by no means certain that the 
withdrawal of ANH or other support is always subject to the same criteria. Studies have 
indicated that doctors are willing to initiate, or continue, ANH even when it can be 
shown to have no possible therapeutic effect. Whether this response was a result of 
conscience salving, fear of litigation, or merely routine practice, is not clear^. 
Other Bodies have made clear their views. In giving evidence to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Medical Ethics. The BMA has made the distinction between feeding 
by natural and artificial treatment and medical care, in that the former is dependent on 
some proposed benefit for the patient and absent that benefit may be refused or 
withdrawn^, and the latter is a continuing function which may not^. Furthermore the 
Association points out that any difference in viewpoint between artificial means of 
nutrition, and other types of artificial life support, "may be partly due to the fact that by 
discontinuing nutrition, doctors are making explicit the intention that the patient should 
die. Withdrawal of other treatments may lack the same explicitness of intention"'0. It 
may be noted however, that in an earlier Report, the BMA categorically accepted that 
"feeding/gastronomy tubes for nutrition and hydration are medical treatments"! 1. 
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Other Bodies disagree with the view of the BMA: the Royal College of Nursing is 
adamant that the withdrawal of "food and fluid is a different and more complex issue 
than the decision to stop other forms of medical treatmenf'2. Professor Scarisbrick, 
giving evidence to the Select Committee on behalf of LIFE and in affirming that he does 
see distinction between the provision of food by mouth and by artificial means, said : 
"The courts did no service to society by saying that food and drink were a form 
of medical care"'3 
It appears then that there is some disagreement between medical professionals as to 
a distinction between ANH and other means of feeding, but that, as was accepted by their 
Lordships in Bland, the majority of doctors at any rate, are content to see it withdrawn on 
the same basis as other life-support measures. However, whilst the consensus amongst 
physicians is clear, other opinion, both medical, and non-medical, may be divided, which 
opens up further debate as to whether the Bolam test should play such a significant role 
(or any role?), in decisions to withdraw ANH. 
The Wider Debate 
There are various schools of thought on the issue. Gilbert Meilaender disputes the 
argument that ANH is but one category of life support. He contends that providing food 
and drink is the sort of care people owe each other, and that since the provision of food 
and drink is not of itself curative, to withdraw feeding is to withdraw that which sustains 
lifel4. He quotes The President's Commissionl5 which suggests that as regards the 
permanently unconscious, certain types of care are mandatory nonetheless, giving as an 
example care to prevent pressure sores. Meilaender argues that it there is no benefit to be 
gained by feeding these patients, neither should it be seen as harm to discontinue these 
other types of basic nursing care. He further argues that any analogy with disconnecting a 
respirator is false since whereas the withdrawal of nutrition has but one certain outcome, 
there is the possibility of spontaneous breathing in the other case, and in order to make a 
true analogy, were the patient to start spontaneous breathing, it would be necessary then 
to smother him. Thus in his view, feeding cannot be likened to medical treatment and 
thus withdrawn in some circumstances. In Meilaender's view, since PVS is not 
burdensome to the patient, ANH is not fiitile since it preserves the life of a non-dying 
patient. It is ordinary nursing care, not given as treatment and its withdrawal can have 
only one intent and that is to bring about the death of the patient. 
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Other commentators are of the view that the withdrawal of ANH and other measures 
merits no difference in principle; Lynn and Childress "there is no reason to apply a 
different ethical standard to feeding and hydration"'^. Likewise Brock in the same 
publication agrees '7. However, some commentators agree with Meilander. Ronald 
Cranford for instance contends that there is a difference for several reasons, including his 
assertion that feeding is moral imperative, and that withdrawal might be taken to be the 
cause of death 18. 
Thus amongst commentators there seems to be widespread disagreement as to 
whether ANH can be seen as merely a type of life-supporting medical treatment, or 
whether it has some added significance which differentiates it from them. 
The Legal View 
In the USA the question of withdrawal of life-support in general and ANH in 
particular has been widely debated both in and out of the courtroom English law has been 
slow to tackle the issue and. debate in England has been more muted, confined largely to 
the withdrawal of invasive medical care of the terminally i l l or congenitally deformed 
neonates. Until Bland the courts had not been asked to determine in what circumstances 
the withdrawal of ANH is lawful, and even in Bland Lord Mustill expressed serious 
doubts as to its justiciability'^. Furthermore, given the narrow grounds of the decision in 
Bland the present law appears little more certain. In Bland the House of Lords would 
accept no difference between the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and the withdrawal of 
other medical procedures. However, to bracket ANH as a treatment to be governed by the 
same principles as other life-supporting treatment, may be in itself too simplistic and 
further begs the question as to whether there remains a distinction between ANH and 
other means of nutrition. What their Lordships failed to make clear, (it not being at issue 
in Bland), was whether there is any distinction to be made between ANH and other 
medical procedures, and further, whether or not such a distinction is recognised, whether 
oral feeding may ever be withdrawn. 
In Bland in the lower courts it had been argued that there is indeed a significant 
distinction, and that, in part because of that distinction unlike other forms of medical 
procedure, A N H may never lawfully be withdrawn. The medical witnesses included some 
of the outstanding authorities in the United Kingdom on the condition of PVS. In his 
evidence to the Select Committee ,Professor Jennett told the court that in both the United 
States and in Canada, tube feeding is accepted as medical treatment and that in his own 
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opinion "naso-gastric feeding may be equated with a ventilator or kidney machine as a 
means of substituting a natural function which has failed"20. This view was echoed by 
Peter U. Behan. However, evidence was also given by Dr. Keith Andrews expressing the 
contrary view; viz. that feeding by tube is not medical treatment and "The use of the 
equipment might be thought to be medical treatment but not the supply of food which is a 
basic human requirement"2l. 
It was submitted for the Trust Hospital, in a rather curious but unchallenged analogy, 
submitted that the same basic principles should be applied as mRe F "because what is 
proposed by Dr. Howe [the withdrawal of treatment] is effectively medical 
treatment"22,23, "and is in the patient's best interests". Were this to be accepted, 
curiously it would put treatment by withdrawal in exactly the same category as any other 
treatment in so far as being governed by the principle of best interests — a subtle but 
essential difference from the ratio in 5/a«<i where the best interests test related to it«o/ 
being in AB's best interest to continue treatment, rather than itbeing in his best interests 
not to continue. It is submitted that this would be the very position that would leave the 
door open to euthanasia that their Lordships went to such pains to avoid. This would 
indeed lead to "The slippery-slope" which Mr. Munby, for the Official Solicitor feared. . 
Notwithstanding some contrary evidence, Sir Stephen Brown P. was satisfied that 
"overwhelming medical evidence" supported the view that artificial feeding, at any rate 
by means of naso-gastric tube, is medical treatment. This view was echoed both at the 
Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords. In the Court of Appeal Sir Thomas Bingham 
MR relied on a Report from the BMA to support the view that ANH is counted as 
medical treatment24. Relying on "a wealth of medical expertise" and the recently decided 
American case of Cruzan all the judges in the Court of Appeal accepted that feeding by 
means of a naso-gastric tube is medical treatment, although Hoffman L. J. appeared to 
limit this assertion to the present case25. In the House of Lords, Lord Keith agreed that 
looked at as part of a regime and not merely as a means of nourishment, ANH is medical 
treatment26. Lord Goff, in his leading judgement also accepted that ANH is medical 
treatment, but he too qualified this to some extent by adding "and even i f it is not strictly 
medical treatment it must form part of the medical care"27. He then went on to equate 
ANH to life support by a ventilator, arguing that therefore both should be governed by 
the same principles. Reports from medical and Medico-legal bodies, members of the 
House of Lords also cited the recently decided American Supreme Court case of 
Cruzan^^, but the question had been addressed on previous occasions by State Courts. 
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Whilst the Courts in England sanctioned the withdrawal of ANH, firstly in Bland 
and subsequently in Frenchay, in considering the present position in the UK, it is useful 
to examine the law in other common law jurisdictions. In the landmark cases of first 
Conroy^^ and later in Cruzari^^ , the American Courts considered the issue in depth. The 
case of Cruzan explicitly concerned a patient in PVS, whereas the decision, if not the 
discussion, in Conroy was limited to elderly patients in nursing homes who have a life 
expectancy of less than one year. However, in cases earlier than either of these the 
American courts first faced the issues, and subsequently the question of the withdrawal of 
life support has been debated widely both in and out of the courtroom. In the US a large 
number of Apellate Courts have considered the legality of withdrawing ANH. 
The first case to consider the issue came before the American Courts in criminal 
proceedings. In Barber^\ murder charges were brought against the two physicians, 
Negdel arid Barber after they had withdrawn ANH from their patient. The charges 
however, were dismissed at a preliminary hearing. More recently in Corbett v 
D'Alessandro^'^ , the court stated that there is no reason to differentiate between the 
multitude of artificial devices which enable prolongation of life. In a rash of cases in the 
mid eighties the courts had sanctioned the removal of naso-gastric tubes from both 
competent and incompetent patients alike, including some patients in PVS (Jobes, 
In examining the whole area of the withdrawal of treatment, and setting down for the 
first time the principles that should be applied in allowing cessation of treatment, in 
Conra>'34 The New Jersey Supreme Court was categorical in its finding that ANH is 
medical care. However, the court did make a clear distinction between ANH and other 
means of nutrition. Schrieber J. said: 
"Artificial feedings such as naso-gastric tubes, gastronstomies, and intravenous 
infusions are significantly different from bottle-feeding or spoon-feeding — 
they are medical procedures with inherent risks and possible side-effects, 
instituted by skilled healthcare providers." 35 
In 1990 a case reached the US Supreme Court in which it was asked to sanction the 
removal of a gastrostomy tube from an elderly woman in PVS. In Cruzan Justices 
Brennan and O'Conner both made references to the nature of ANH and both relied on 
recent medico-legal publications to support their views36. Justice O'Conner stated:-
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"Artificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other forms of medical 
treatment"37 
Justice Brennan was even more convinced that ANH is even more commensurate 
with other medical treatment:-
"The artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration is undoubtedly medical 
treatment"38 
Both Judges took the view that initiating treatment requires medical or surgical 
techniques and the patient needs close monitoring, and that therefore such treatment 
should properly be counted as medical treatment. It seems then that both in the American 
and English courts, the judiciary is content to accept the consensus of medical opinion 
that ANH is, or is akin to, medical treatment. However, the same cannot be said about the 
legislature since many states in America have excluded ANH expressly from measures to 
allow withdrawal of life-support treatments39. However, this takes us to a further issue: 
even i f ANH is medical treatment, may, or should, it be withdrawn under exactly the 
same principles as all other treatments, or are there, or should there be, additional 
restraints to be placed on its withdrawal? 
It seems then, that at present the courts take their lead from the medical profession 
and do not dispute the latter's view that ANH is medical treatment. However, it may be 
that the medical view is an insufficient basis on which to formulate a legal principle to 
cover methods of artificial nutrition as diverse as intravenous hydration by vene-
puncture, gastrostomy requiring surgical procedure, and the merely mechanical naso-
gastric feeding. Neither does, or should it, help in the even more controversial area of the 
withdrawal of feeding by mouth. The question may be considered in two parts: firstly, 
should the initial provision, or subsequent withdrawal, of ANH be subject to the same 
principles as other forms of life-supporting treatment, and secondly, i f not, in what 
circumstances should ANH be withheld or vyithdrawn? 
The Withdrawal of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration — The 
same Principles as Other Treatments? 
The withdrawal of ANH, no less than the withdrawal of food and drink, conjures up 
the spectre of an emaciated body with parched lips and in the unendurable agony of 
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starvation. Does this "sloganism of starvation", as Judith Ahronheim and M Rose Gasner 
have termed it,40 He at the root of concern regarding the withdrawal of ANH or are there 
rational and proper arguments in favour of this natural repugnance? 
Even though most commentators do not oppose the withdrawal of most life support 
treatments, many express reservations about the withdrawal of ANH. Various arguments 
have been advanced to suggest that even i f artificial nutrition and hydration are medical 
treatments, they do differ significantly from other treatments, and that therefore they 
should never be withdrawn or, less dogmatically, that there are additional criteria to be 
satisfied before they may be withdrawn. In a fairly recent publication, Joanne Lynn 
gathered together the views on the withdrawal of ANH, of a number of eminent 
American commentators. This collection explores many, but not all, of the arguments 
relating to the withdrawal of nutritional. It is useful for the present purposes, to examine 
these arguments, in an.endeavour to find both a consensus viewpoint, and a rationale for 
it. 
There is a strong argument to the effect that it is never right to withhold food and 
drink from the needy, who, perforce include those incapable of feeding themselves. 
However most commentators contend that this obligation to feed may not be absolute. 
Obviously where feeding is by mouth the requirement to feed is strongest, but even 
then it is it generally felt to be acceptable to forgo feeding where to feed imposes a 
burden on the patient which is not balanced by any benefit of an improvement in comfort, 
health, or life expectancy. 
The arguments to prohibit the withdrawal of ANH are numerous; that ANH is part or 
basic nursing care; that it is ordinary as opposed to extraordinary care; that it has 
symbolic s'ignificance which precludes withdrawal; that it is nothing more than deliberate 
killing; that society wil l suffer once an absolute duty to feed the needy is breached; that 
the slippery slope means that what starts out as a possibility will rapidly become an 
obligation. In addition to the "ordinary treatment" and "symbolic nature" arguments, 
Childress and Lynn posit two further, but in their view, equally spurious arguments; an 
obligation to continue treatment once started, and an obligation. not to be the 
unambiguous cause of death42. 
I f we take as the starting point the principle that, as regards an incompetent patient 
both medical treatment and nursing care must be undertaken in the patient's best 
interests, can it ever be in those interests for him to become dehydrated and 
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undernourished? Providing adequate nutrition and hydration is vital in the majority of 
health care regimes, both to provide palliative care and to aid recovery. However, it is not 
of itself treatment and some commentators have held that it is intrinsically wrongs to 
deny nutrition to another. Lynn and Childress, writing in by No Extraordinary Means, 
quote the philosopher G. E. M . Anscombe:-
"For wilful starvation there can be no excuse. The same can't be said quite without 
qualification about failing to operate or to adopt some courses of treatment"43 
Anscombe then is an absolutist, in his view nutrition must never be withdrawn. 
Childress and Lynn however, argue that this goes too far, and that i f the delivery of ANH 
does not always (added emphasis) improve a patient's well-being, it is difficult to defend 
an absolute bar on its withdrawal. They propose three situations in which withdrawal is 
morally acceptable. Firstly, where it is unlikely that attempts to nourish and hydrate will 
achieve that purpose; secondly, where to do so would render no benefit to the patient, and 
thirdly, where the benefits to the patient, of doing so. are outweighed by the burdens to 
him44. They rely in part on a study on dying cancer patients which showed that some 
patients were more comfortable when not given artificial hydration45. 
Clearly patients in PVS wil l mostly fall into the second category of gaining no 
benefit. It is submitted that these circumstances are those which are relevant to the 
withdrawal of any medical treatment. 
It is interesting to note that, on the Lynn/Childress analysis, for a patient in PVS, the 
criterion for withdrawal of no benefit for the patient, is subtly different from the best 
interests test applied by the House of Lords in Bland some six years later. It may be 
argued that were their Lordships to have decided upon this principle, (of no benefit), 
rather than best interests to govern the withdrawal of ANH, much of their obvious legal 
machinations might have been avoided. However, it is conceded that such a principle 
might be open to abuse, i f not actually opening the door to passive euthanasia or even 
active euthanasia. 
Other commentators are very much more cautious, urging strict criteria for 
withdrawal of i f not an absolute bar on the practice. Callahan only just falls short of 
demanding such a bar46. He welcomes the present widespread repugnance to the 
withdrawal of ANH as a defence against the slippery slope of the possible becoming the 
probable, and the consequent general acceptance of withdrawal pressaging the 
"destruction of society". As yet, it may be argued that there is little evidence of this, nor 
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is the one, the inevitable concomitant of the other (Childress). Furthermore, providing a 
presumption in favour of ANH is maintained, the present revulsion to withdrawal can be 
viewed as mere sentiment rather than a moral imperative. However, even Childress 
concedes that the similarities of providing nutrition by all means may form the basis of an 
argument for an absolute bar on the withdrawal on ANH, but maintains nonetheless, that 
once withdrawal is sanctioned for any one type in particular circumstances, this argument 
flounders. 
Several of their Lordships in Bland expressed concern in a principle which might 
appear to sancfion deliberate killing but none would find analogy with either G/66/«j v 
Proctor^^ or Reg v StoneA^ Per Mustill:-
"Of course the cases are miles apart, but where is the difference and the essential 
facts?"49 
How does the claim that the withdrawal of ANH amounts to a death sentence stand 
up to scrutiny? On the one hand, it may be argued that withdrawal of ANH is no different 
from any other withdrawal of life-supporting measure, and furthermore that any denial 
that all result in death, is merely and attempt by carers to distance themselves from this 
inevitable outcome. Similarly, a;llowing ANH at a rate insufficient to be effective, (as in 
the administering of IV fluids at a "to keep open" rate), in order to maintain the 
symbolism of providing food, is likewise self-deception (Childress). Death results when 
life-supporting measures are withdrawn. Evidence submitted to the Select Committee on 
Medical Ethics includes the contention that "the withdrawal of treatment in order to end 
life would be euthanasia — no less than positive intervention".50 Others are equally 
adamant whilst limifing the prohibition to nutrition:-
"It should make no difference whether food is served on a fray, spoon-fed, eaten 
with the aid of artificial dentures or administered through a tube, the intentional 
denial of food for non-therapeutic reasons is nothing other than euthanasia''^ 1 
However, it may be argued that talk by opponents of withdrawal of ANH in terms of 
killing or starving, paint a false picture and are merely provocative since withdrawal of 
A N H bears no resemblance to the commonly held view of starvation. Yet it is this 
commonly held view which makes the withdrawal of ANH such an emotive subject, and 
almost inevitably more traumatic than other withdrawal for the relatives, i f not for the 
patient himself. This leads us to two arguments not yet considered fully, and which form 
the basis of many of the calls for the withdrawal of ANH either to be subject to additional 
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criteria, or indeed subject to an absolute bar. These arguments are firstly, that feeding 
including ANH, is part of basic care, and secondly, that the symbolism of feeding the 
helpless precludes withdrawal. 
The "Two Most Frequent" Arguments 
Here we shall explore the validity of arguments that firstly ANH is basic care and 
therefore may never be lawfully withdrawn, and secondly that its symbolic significance 
also precludes withdrawal. 
Is ANH Basic Care? 
It has been argued that ANH cannot directly be equated with feeding by mouth, but 
as has been seen, there is no universal agreement that it is merely a category of medical 
treatment, and indeed many physicians consider that basic humane care requires that 
patients must always be given food and water. It has further been argued that the emotive 
portrayal of patients for whom ANH has been withdrawn, as suffering starvation in a 
similar manner to those depicted in areas of famine, is dishonest,52 since the medical 
facts speak otherwise. Of course for the patient in PVS, suffering as such, has no 
meaning. Could then, we say that the provision of basic care to such a patient is 
immaterial? Surely not; it is unthinkable not to tend the sick whether the patient has hope 
of recovery or not, or even whether he can appreciate such care. Not to keep such a 
patient warm, clean and decently covered would be seen a dereliction of a duty. As 
regards an incompetent patient who is able to take food and drink orally, feeding would 
be considered part of this duty to provide basic nursing care. The question we must now 
ask is, whether the delivery of nutrition and hydration by artificial means alters either the 
nature of the act or the duty to provide it. 
We can all empathise with hunger and thirst and many people feel that ANH should 
be distinguished from other life-supporting measures because whatever the means of 
delivery, it still feeding, and as such is basic comfort care in the same category as warmth 
and personal hygiene. Steinbrook and Lo however, suggest an emerging medical, ethical 
and Legal consensus that ANH is on a level with other treatments and should not be 
considered part of either ordinary care or routine nursing care53. Nurses may not agree. 
In Brophy, it was the patient's nurse who blew the whistle on the two doctors. She said:-
"Food is an ordinary means of care, and everyone has a right to ordinary treatment"54 
77 
Chapter 6 The Withdrawal Of Artificial Nutrition And Hydration 
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Royal College of Nursing in its evidence 
to the House of Lords Select Committee considering the withdrawal of life-supporting 
medical treatment. The college declared that nurses 
"see feeding somebody as very fundamental to our whole practice and that the 
withdrawal of feeding, in whatever form it is being given, can produce very 
strange conflicts for us"55 
The BMA however seems to have taken the most useful approach in making a clear 
distinction between treatment and care, the former to be withheld in the absence of some 
anticipated benefit to the patient, the latter to be always available. The BMA emphasised 
the continuing nature of care:-
"medical care... is an expression of the doctor's long recognised duty to respond 
with compassion to the sick and needy"56 
In a later article, Childress returns to the debate regarding arguments to preclude the 
withdrawal of ANH57. Here, however, he redefines what he considers the two most 
frequent arguments as firstly, the duty to provide patient comfort and dignity and 
secondly, the symbolic nature of feeding. However, he uses the same premise against 
these revised arguments as he and Lynn employed in the earlier piece, albeit in slightly 
different terms: He asserts that the fundamental principle of best interests establishes a 
presumption in favour of all life-prolonging treatment, but that the presumption is 
rebuttable by either futility, the absence of any benefit for the patient, or on a benefit-
burden analysis, and furthermore, that these criteria apply to all types of treatment's. 
Thus far he merely rehashes his former position, but he goes on to explore arguments 
about whether nutrition and hydration should either be excluded from the general position 
as regards withdrawal of life-supporting treatment, or prohibited altogether. As regards 
comfort and dignity, and tackling the comfort element first, Childress dismisses this on 
his previous assertion that the argument fails in circumstances where continuation 
reduces patient comfort, relying once more on the study of a relatively small number of 
dying cancer patients59 and an article in the Nursing Press^ O. Dignity causes Childress a 
little more difficulty. Here, the argument that routine nursing care is a matter of human 
dignity and is thus not an option for medical judgement is skated over on the meagre 
premise that the dignity of the patient can equally be protected by the wetting of parched 
lips. An alternative argument in favour of dignity could be furnished by emphasising the 
indignity of the continuation of some, i f not all, methods of ANH once one of his stated 
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thresholds is reached, and that a person's dignity is best upheld by considering the 
manner of death rather than its timing. 
The Symbolic Nature Of Feeding 
Whilst the "sloganism of starvation" may militate against rational decision making 
as regards the withdrawal of ANH, the emotional significance of feeding may do the 
reverse. Emotions attach to nourishment that do not apply to other life-sustaining 
measures. Both courts and commentators have recognised this symbolism. InConroy, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged the "emotional significance" of feeding whilst 
at the same time declaring that ANH is nonetheless medical treatment6l. Callahan calls it 
"the most fundamental of human relationships"62. Carson declares:-
"To allay the hunger and slake the thirst of a dying person, is deemed across 
time and cultures to be not only right but good"63 
and again 
"To nourish is to nurse; to offer food and water is to tend and regard" 
Carson, however concedes that ANH in a medical setting, does not merit the same 
symbolic significance as it does in ordinary life and that therefore, it should not determine 
medical options or decisions. Landsman is in agreement with this view "to rely on 
symbolism... is to acknowledge that the welfare of the individual being treated is 
irrelevant".64 I f we take this view, the symbolic significance of feeding may be displaced 
by patient welfare. Furthermore, it is submitted that welfare should include not only 
physical well-being, but also human dignity. The whole tenor of Childress and Lynn's 
argument as regards the symbolism of feeding, rejects a sufficient symbolic significance 
to preclude its withdrawal absolutely. They accept that there is indeed some symbolic 
significance in providing food and water, which is, for most people, reinforced by a 
perception of the discomfort normally felt by hunger and thirst, However they argue that 
the overriding criterion should be net benefit to the patient, and, absent that, the 
symbolism of feeding is mere sentiment. In his later article, Childress returns to this 
argument. He challenges Callahan's assertion that feeding the needy is the most 
fundamental of human relationships, by arguing that Callahan's view is based on 
assumptions about the benefits of, and preferences for ANH, which, whilst they may be 
sufficient to establish a presumption in favour of continuation, are insufficient to create 
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an absolute bar to cessation, and that thus, as a symbol of a patient's interests it may have 
little to do with his actual interests. 
Ronald Carson contends that the symbolic meaning of an act is seldom obvious and 
is of the view that it is the reciprocity of offering and acceptance which gives symbolic 
significance. He argues that Callahan's call to cultivate a deep-seated repugnance to the 
withdrawal of ANH should rightly be balanced by a similar dislike of treating in the face 
of futility for example. He suggests in those circumstances feeding can properly be 
replaced with other forms of care such as sips of liquid or ice chips to allay dryness of the 
mouth. He avers that such forms of care maintain the ritual of tending and non 
abandonment and are a suitable replacement for futile feeding65. 
Many carers consider that humane care demands that patients must always be given 
food and drink because it represents love and concern for the helpless. May not this 
concern be expressed in alternative, but no less symbolic ways such as the wetting of 
parched lips, touching, stroking or merely talking to, a patient? At the end of the day is 
the thought of withdrawal of ANH mere squeamishness because it/ee/5 different from 
switching off a ventilator? Although it seems morally right to offer food and water, and 
our hearts tell us to deliver ANH, our heads may suggest that more rational criteria 
should determine decision making. 
Many of the objections to the withdrawal of ANH may be answered fairly by 
counter arguments such as those forwarded by Childress, and some of Callahan's fears 
would be countered by a set of guidelines such as those recently published by the BMA. 
However, even allowing that there are circumstances in which it is right to discontinue 
ANH, there is still room for debate, because even if ANH is seen as medical treatment 
and not basic care, and even if the symbolic significance of feeding does not carry to 
artificial methods of nutrition, there is some deep-seated feeling that ANH is feeding 
nonetheless and should be subject to stricter, or merely different criteria from the 
withdrawal of other life-sustaining measures. It is submitted that the BMA's attitude here, 
of separating treatment with its therapeutic value, from care with its tending but non-
therapeutic function, is not only the most practical solution, but also the most moral. 
Presumably, on this basis, the BMA would classify feeding other than by artificial means 
as care and therefore never to be withdrawn. This solution would appear to go a long way 
in answering the argument that the symbolic nature of feeding precludes withdrawal, 
particularly it one takes note of Ronald Carson's submission that the symbolism of 
tending may be exhibited by other, but no less symbolic and nurturing care. If we take 
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this view, it becomes clear that by separating the therapeutic and caring functions of 
medical care, we can also keep clear what procedures may, in some circumstances be 
withdrawn, and those which must always be furnished. However the case of Bland may 
have put the withdrawal of ANH in to a particular category even for patients who are not 
in PVS, for although feeding may be seen as futile i f the goal is a return to a cognitive 
state nonetheless it may be seen as worthwhile in terms of the emotional and symbolic 
benefits to society as a whole and the patient's relatives in particular. 
Here we have considered some of the wide-ranging arguments surrounding the 
withdrawal of ANH. Steinbrook and Lo may claim that there is an "emerging 
consensus"66, but it is clear that the debate on may be but in its infancy and to rely on a 
somewhat dubious claim to consensus does not address entirely the controversy regarding 
the withdrawal of ANH. There is little doubt that the debate is up and running, that it has 
far to go and that it is hotting up.67 
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7. The Gloss from Bland: Is It Good Law? 
We have now explored many of the issues raised in Bland and have reached the 
point where the decision in that case may be re-examined in the light of conclusions 
reached here. We have determined that the majority opinion is that ANH is a medical 
treatment, which, although imbued with some symbolic or philosophical significance, is 
not a part of such basic care as should never be withdrawn. It appears that, although 
legislation in many American States does differentiate between the withdrawal of ANH 
and other medical procedures, for the time being at any rate, the English courts accept the 
majority view. Thus, as the law stands post Bland, ANH may be withdrawn from an 
incompetent patient who is, or following Frenchay may be, in PVS, on a finding by the 
doctor in charge that in his opinion it is in the patient's best interests that treatment, 
including ANH, should be withdrawn. 
However, whilst there may well be an "emerging consensus" within medical 
opinion, and although for the time being, the English courts are willing to take their lead 
from doctors, any common view regarding the withdrawal of ANH is less clear amongst 
other commentators. Undoubtedly, amongst some of these there remains unease at the 
thought that for those for whom no therapeutic benefit from further treatment is 
considered likely, the withdrawal of feeding, albeit confined to ANH, may be an option 
under the principle of best interests, particularly i f those interests are to be decided solely 
by doctors according to theBolam test. The dilemma left hy Bland lies in the fact that the 
cessation of the invasive procedure of ANH that their Lordships saw as against 
Anthony's best interests, has but one inevitable and unavoidable conclusion, and that is 
that the patient wil l die. In the withdrawal of no other treatment is the outcome quite so 
sure. Aware of this inevitable outcome, the House of Lords in Bland nonetheless 
sanctioned withdrawal. True, several of their Lordships were troubled by the obvious 
parallel between Bland and the murder and manslaughter cases of Gibbins and Proctor, 
and Stone respectively. It is submitted rightly so, for the parallel in principle between 
these two cases and Bland surely is greater than their Lordships were prepared to admit. 
As Lord Mustill, whilst claiming the cases "miles apart" ethically, put it, "but where is 
the difference in the essential facts"'. Where indeed is the difference? leaves a 
state of affairs which is far from satisfactory, for now a patient's life may be brought to 
an end lawfully by ceasing life-sustaining treatment in circumstances which do not 
appear to accord with established law. 
Chapter 7 The^ Gloss From Bland: Is It Good Law? 
On re-examining their Lordships' deliberations, it appears that several legal strands 
have become entangled, which when separated out lead to the conclusion that the 
decision in Bland is either flawed, new law, or at best incomplete. By joining the duties 
of a doctor both to treat in the best interests of the patient and in accordance with the 
Bolam principle, together with a prohibition on non-consensual treatment, their Lordships 
have come up with an answer which appears to demand the intentional ending of a 
patient's life by prohibiting further treatment. Furthermore, this prohibition may be 
decided when according to the personal view of a doctor, tempered only by the Bolam 
test when he has determined, not a best interest to cease treatment, but a lack of best 
interest to continue it. 
In an endeavour to disentangle the issues m Bland it may be useful to re-examine the 
present law once again. Some things at least are clear. Firstly, no positive act to bring 
about the death of a patient is lawful. This is so regardless of futility or any 
burden/benefit analysis. Secondly, a doctor determining treatment for an incompetent 
patient must act in his best interests. However, all over the world, no less in England than 
in any other country, life-sustaining treatment is being withdrawn or withheld, both from 
the .competent and incompetent patient, and had been for many years prior to Bland. 
What makes Bland significant is that withdrawal here falls into none of the previously 
acceptable categories. Prior to Bland, the law allowed withdrawal of some treatments on 
the bases of refusal (actual or anticipatory), futility or on a benefit/burden analysis. On 
this latter point. Lord Goff whilst referring to the case oiRe declined to consider the 
principles which should apply to such determination of best interests. Futility has been 
taken to mean that the patient wil l die shortly whatever treatment is given, and that thus 
further treatment is useless, and that therefore the patient may be "allowed to die". AB 
was neither dying nor would he have died in the immediate future, had ANH not been 
discontinued. In Bland, Lord Goff pointed to a distinction between cases in which some 
balancing exercise could properly be carried out, and those such as the present where, 
such an equation is nieaningless3. Both categories are dependent on the determination of 
best interests however. In Bland then, treatment was not futile in the accepted sense, no 
balancing exercise could sensibly be carried out, but treatment was allowed to be 
withdrawn nonetheless on the basis of best interests. Their Lordships however went to 
great lengths to emphasise that as regards a patient in PVS, the question is not whether it 
is in the patient's best interests to die, but whether his best interests lie in not continuing 
treatment. It is submitted that this is where the confusion lies, for ifBland was decided on 
the basis of best interests, it does not go far enough, but if as appears more truthfully, on a 
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basis of no interests, the decision must be either new law or flawed. It is the extent of the 
doctor's duty to treat and the relationship between this duty and best interests which 
holds the key. 
A brief resume of their Lordships' is useful. Whilst at the same time as professing 
doubt about saying that best interests favours withdrawal. Lord Keith was clearly of the 
opinion that it was the conferring of no benefit, to be determined by "a large body" of 
medical opinion which is the key. For Lord Goff, the essence of the issue lay in the 
futility of further treatment because AB was unconscious with no prospect of recovery: 
again no benefit analysis, but a novel characterisation of futility. It is of note that he 
stated categorically that in the absence of any therapeutic purpose, firstly, medical 
treatment is not appropriate "simply to prolong life", and secondly, that as regards the 
present case no reason existed to refuse consent to cease treatrnent "simply because it 
involves ANH". Lord Lowry put the matter ^slightly differently relying on 
"overwhelming" medical opinion to the effect that feeding merely to sustain life is "not 
necessarily for the benefit of the patient", and the fact that in the present case the doctors 
considered that "in the patient's best interests they ought hot to feed". Again apparently a 
no-benefit rationale couched in terms of best interests to cease treatment. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson also emphasised the withdrawal in terms of not being in the best interests to 
continue invasive life support. 
Lord Mustill employed a different argument, and in doing so perhaps hit the nail on 
the head. Having asserted that the justification for non-consensual treatment is best 
interests, he went further in declaring: 
"The distressing truth which must not be shirked is that the proposed conduct is 
not in the best interests of Anthony Bland, for he has no best interests of any 
kind"4 
He thus concluded therefore that the justification for further treatment no longer 
existed. However, he then went on to claim that it was in AB's best interests that 
treatment was not continued. This somewhat contradictory passage may hold the way 
forward in that perhaps the reason for withdrawal of ANH from a patient in PVS should 
be that such a patient has no present interests at all. 
The essence of the judgements of Lords Keith, Goff, Lowry and Browne-Wilkinson 
is that further treatment offers no benefit and that the invasive nature of such treatment is 
therefore not in the best interests of the patient. However, it is difficult to see how the 
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invasiveness or otherwise of any treatment of which the victim is unaware, can be 
counted as a factor to weigh in favour of discontinuance. Thus, the basis of their 
Lordships' conclusions was that in the absence of an interest in continuing treatment it 
was not in AB's best interests; and further, that because it was not in AB's best interests, 
the duty to treat ceased and the omission to treat became lawful. With respect, this 
confuses the separate issues of lack of benefit and best interests, and thence the issue of 
the extent of a doctor's duty in the absence of any interests. Furthermore, whilst the 
decision absolved AB's doctors of criminal or civil liability, it did nothing to demonstrate 
AB's best interests. Indeed it could not do so, having declared that he had none. 
What then is the real basis of Bland? To use the best interest test surely is 
inappropriate, for it is totally immaterial to a patient in PVS whether his treatment is 
continued or withdrawn. In these circumstances the notion of best interests is a fictions. 
What is more, i f we go one step further, and take Lord Mustill's view that this patient has 
no best interests of any kind, the dishonesty of best interests being prayed in aid of lawful 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment becomes even more apparent. 
Best Interests Revisited 
In further exploring the best interests test, we can start by examining the purposes of 
treatment. The primary purpose is to cure, and obviously in order to effect recovery, life 
must be maintained in the mean time. Where cure is not possible, treatment is aimed at 
alleviating symptoms and preventing deterioration. However, once distress has been 
alleviated, where no recovery is possible, treatment then focuses on maintaining such 
quality of life as the patient is capable of enjoying. We come now to the crux of the 
dilemma in Bland. Whilst Lord Goff acknowledged a distinction in rationale between the 
withdrawal of treatment from patients where some balance of benefit against burden may 
be calculated, and its withdrawal from those patients for whom such an exercise is 
meaningless, he nonetheless made clear that the best interests tests is the appropriate test 
in both categories. Can this be so? 
The best interests test lends itself to a balancing of benefits against burdens, and it is 
submitted that best interests may only be adduced by the weighing of benefits against 
burdens: there is no other possible way to determine such interests. That being so, best 
interests may be the appropriate test to determine which of alternative treatments to 
provide, and also to decide on the withdrawal or withholding of treatment where some 
balancing is possible, even when that course of action will hasten death, that hastening 
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being part of the equation, but best interests can have no possible relevance where no 
balance is possible. 
Clearly under present law, no best interest supports positive action to kill , but what 
interests support ^yithdrawal when death is then inevitable? Whatever interest it might be, 
it is submitted that the duty to continue treatment cannot lapse in the absence of best 
interests to do otherwise, and therefore it cannot lapse in the absence of any interests 
whatsoever. However, even i f AB did have some interests, what possible interests could 
favour discontinuance and inevitable death? The answer is far from clear and their 
Lordships' deliberations m Bland offer little light. Whilst they pray in aid the principle of 
best interests, no satisfactory rationale is given for why AB's best interests lay in 
discontinuance rather than continued treatment. The nearest they came was to declare that 
it was because further treatment afforded no benefit. The pertinent question therefore, is 
whether absence of benefit alone is sufficient, or whether some positive detriment needs 
to be demonstrated. It is submitted that the latter is the case, and that AB had no interests 
that ANH should cease. Can we say that notwithstanding a total lack of sentience or 
cognisance, continuing treatment imposes some burden of sufficient weight to balance 
the scales in favour of discontinuance of treatment? Had the only method of keeping AB 
alive been to involve some gross insult to his body by such bodily intrusion whereby his 
body or dignity was open to degradation or ridicule, there might be an argument for 
claiming his interests did not lie in further treatment. However, nothing could have been 
further from the truth; AB was lovingly tended by a devoted family and medical staff. To 
claim that this loving care affronted the best interests of AB who, their Lordships claimed 
had no best interests, is too strong? It is of course possible to assert that a patient has the 
right to die with dignity which outweighs the principle of the sanctity of life and the duty 
of the doctor to prolong life. Indeed, Wilson claims that there has been a societal shift 
towards this view notwithstanding that this road may lead to the acceptance of mercy 
killing and euthanasia.6 
Absent any cognisance or sapience, does life itself impose a burden of sufficient 
weight? Clearly not. Only i f mere absence of benefit is counted as a detriment, which is, 
it appears what Bland dictates, could there be an interest in ceasing treatment. However, 
unless there is neither a best interest-to continue, nor to cease treatment the duty is to do 
one or the other, it cannot be optional. Thus, i f further treatment M in the patient's best 
interests it must continue, but i f it is no longer in his best interests it must cease. This is 
the uncomfortable conclusion reached by Lords Goff, Lowry and Browne-Wilkinson, on 
88 
Chapter 7 The Gloss From Bland: Is It Good Law? 
the basis that the best interests test for the incompetent is but the justification (of 
necessity), for non-consensual treatment. Once the best interests of the patient are to 
cease treatment, the justification for continuing treatment ceases and any further 
treatment would be an unlawful battery (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). Thus / / as their 
Lordships declared, it was in AB's best interests to have treatment withdrawn, so might it 
be for all patients in PVS with the consequence that all might be denied treatment once an 
unequivocal diagnosis of that condition had been made. This may not have been the 
intention of their Lordships in Bland hut could be the outcome of their decision. 
No Interests 
However, what is the position ifBland has been decided on a basis of no interests at 
all? Is mere absence of benefit sufficient to justify the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment? It is submitted that it is not. Firstly, because the test inRe F is positive, that is 
to act in the best interests of the patient, and not negative that is not to act when not in his 
best interests. Their Lordships declared that because it w a s « o / in AB's best interests to 
continue treatment, the duty to do so ceased and with it justification for non-consensual 
treatment. The argument equally could have run that because it was not in AB's best 
interests to cease treatment, it was therefore in his best interests that treatment continue, 
together with the justificafion for doing so. Secondly, it is submitted that without 
sufficient justification discontinuance offends against the fundamental legal principle of 
the sanctity of life. This principle raises a presumption in favour of maintaining life, and 
although Lord Keith maintained that where life confers no benefit, the withdrawal of 
treatment does no violence to this principle, it is submitted that an absence of benefit is 
insufficient justification for it to be displaced. Obviously the best interests of the patient 
will suffice to displace it, but does any other factor carry sufficient weight? Certainly a 
patient will be allowed to die where further treatment is futile, in that the patient is dying, 
or will die whatever the treatment offered. However, it is difficult to see how treatment 
which sustains life can be characterised as futile, unless it is argued that lifeper se is of 
no benefit. Surely it is the principle that it is which in part militates against both mercy 
killing and euthanasia? It is submitted that an absence of benefit as a general ground for 
the withdrawal of treatment is unsatisfactory since it would open the flood gates to 
widespread abuse and neglect by carers. 
Thus even though their Lordships took care to express it in the terms of not being in 
.AB's best interests to continue treatment, it seems that the basis of the decision inBland 
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rests on a new category of no interests in continuing treatment, or futility, in the sense 
that treatment is not conferring, and will never confer any benefit to the patient. This 
leads to one of two conclusions. Either, Bland should have and possibly has been decided 
on a basis of no interests, which is new law, or the decision is flawed in that an interest 
has been ascribed where in truth there was none. It is submitted that if Bland is right at 
all, it is only half right. Surely the more logical approach would be to say that where a 
patient has interests, a doctor must act, that is treat or withhold treatment in the patient's 
best interests, but that in the absence of any present interests, treatment may be 
withdrawn, not because the doctor has no further duty, nor on the basis that it is not in the 
patient's best interests to continue treatment, but simply on the basis that he has no 
interests at all. However, it might be even more accurate to state that the patient has no 
interest in being kept alive rather than having no interest at all, for it can be argued that 
even the patient in PVS may have an interest in having his body treated with dignity. 
There is one possible argument however, which would uphold the decision m Bland 
as it stands. That is to accept that the best interests test is not limited to the present 
interest of the patient himself. As argued above, if best interestsare to be limited to those 
of the patient at the present time, it cannot be in his best interest to cease treatmentwwfoj 
there is some burden. However if, perhaps more honestly, other factors are included some 
meaning can be given to best interests even in a case where the patient himself has no 
present interests. Thus if we say that it was better for AB's family that treatment should 
cease, or that it is better for society that resources should be better spent, we may be 
nearer the truth. However, even if it is accepted that the best interests test does 
encompass additional factors, unless the inclusion of them is strictly limited to patients in 
P V S , we appear no only to be closer to, but actually on, the slippery slope of saying that 
the patient's interests are so minimal as to be outweighed by these other factors: one 
small step from saying not, that it is in the patient's best interests that treatment should 
cease, but merely that it is better that it should. 
Instead of trying to mould best interests to fit this category of patients, it would have 
been preferable if their Lordships had made clear that the best interests test is not suitable 
in all circumstances, and that for patients in PVS this novel category of futility is more 
appropriate. However, this would have limited the withdrawal of A N H to patients in 
PVS, since for all others some balancing exercise is possible, and there is as yet no 
authority to cover withdrawal in such circumstances.7 (Lord Goff declined to address the 
principles to be considered when this balancing exercise is called for.) Thus it would 
90 
Chapter 7 The Gloss From Bland: Is It Good Law? 
exclude withdrawal from patient suffering other medical conditions, and incidentally 
rendered the decision in Frenchay dubious, since it is far from clear whether the patient 
in that case was in PVS. 
It must be the case that whereas the best interests test is a useful general principle for 
the treatment of the incompetent patient, for the withdrawal of treatment for patients in 
PVS it is wholly inappropriate. In determining that A N H could be withdrawn from A B , 
their Lordships have muddied what, outwith the moral and ethical dilemmas of the 
euthanasia debate, had been clear legal principles. It is submitted that by distorting the 
best interests test to cover patients who in reality have no interests at all, the House of 
Lords, in an endeavour to achieve what, in the case of A B , was a desirable solution, has 
set a course which may be hard to reconcile with both previous good medical practise and 
established criminal law. In any case, it would appear that the decision mBland opens the 
door to the widespread abuse of that principle. Can we say in all honesty that the 
distinction between being in a patient's best interests not to continue treatment, and it 
being in his best interests to die, is sufficient either in principle or practice to avert and 
open door to mercy killing even if such killing is confined to the questionable withdrawal 
of life-sustaining measures? 
1 [1993] 2 WLR 316 at 395 
2/fey[1991]Fam.33 
3 [1993] 2 WLR 316 at 371 
Ibid397 
5 Unless of course one takes the view that the dignity of a patient is best served by cessation of treatment. 
6 William Wilson "Is Life Sacred?" (1995) JSW F L 131 
7 Apart from /?e J[1991] Fam 33 
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Whether Bland is, or is not, good law, unless and until Parliament acts, itis the law 
and has been followed. However, it is already apparent that the very narrow, if not 
exclusive (Lords Mustill and Brown-Wilkinson),. parameters of Bland have been 
extended, and that we may already have embarked on the "slippery slope" which their 
Lordships tried so hard to avoid. Notwithstanding a somewhat equivocal diagnosis of 
PVS and an urgency which seems doubtful, the Court of Appeal m Frenchay set the ball 
rolling with its unwarrantedly hasty decision. However, even conceding urgency and a 
correct diagnosis, there seems little doubt that S was not in as extreme a condition as 
Tony Bland. Had Bland remained the benchmark, although it would appear that a novel 
category of futility has been added to the accepted justifications for the withdrawal of 
medical treatment, at least the door would have remained closed firmly against any 
extension to patients other than those in a clearly diagnosed PVS. PostFrenchay it seems 
that only statutory measures are likely to prevent a "no benefit" rule from relaxing into a 
"minimal benefit" rule, thus opening the door to withdrawal of A N H from any patient, 
(who can be sedated to negate unpleasant side effects of withdrawal), of whom it may be 
said (at present by the doctors alone), that his life is of such minimal benefit to him that it 
is not worth living. 
Neither the legal nor medical professions appear wholly at ease with the present 
position, and both have endeavoured to circumscribe withdrawal of treatment with 
guidelines, but these also are likely, on occasion to be stretched. InBland their Lordships 
called for Parliament to act. Discussion papers abound but as yet no statutory measures 
have been forthcoming, although the Law Commission has included a draft Bill for 
consideration in its recent recommendations relating to medical treatment decisions for 
the mentally incapacitated adultl. 
The House of Lords Report by the Select Committee on Medical Ethics 
recommended that a commonly accepted definifion of PVS and a code of practice would 
be helpful2, including clear diagnostic criteria based on repeated observations over a 
period of at least twelve months. As regards the withdrawal of A N H however, the 
Committee appears to have ducked the real issue. It admitted to being unable to reach 
conclusion save to hope that the withholding of other medical treatment such as 
antibiotics where further treatment is inappropriate, would resolve the issue and "the 
question [of the withdrawal of ANH] should not usually be asked except where its 
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administration is itself burdensome."3 The Committee supported proposals for a new 
judicial forum with the power to make treatment decisions for incompetent patients, but 
would wish to see some mechanism for the inclusion of independent medical and ethical 
advice.4 As regards advance directives however, the Select Committee concluded that 
legislation is unnecessary.5 
The findings of the Select Committee inter alia were taken into account in the Law 
Commission Report. The Commission proposes that the common law best interests test 
should be replaced by a statutory power to give such treatment as is in the best interests 
of the patient, where it isreasonable to do so.. The Commission further proposes the 
establishment of a new Court Protection to include medical treatment decision-making 
powers for incompetent adults. In including in its nine recommendations, statutory rules 
for the withdrawal of A N H from PVS patients and the provision for advance directives, 
the Commission adopts features of both best interests and substituted judgement 
approaches. The Commission lists a number of factors to be taken into account in 
determining best interests; these include inter alia the ascertainable past and present 
wishes of the patient, and factors which the patient might be expected to take into account 
including life expectancy and dignity. It may be noted that these accord with the 
considerations suggested by Hoffman L . J . in Bland. 
Doctors have already received guidance regarding advance directives in a code of 
practice drafted by the House of Lords Select Committee and the B M A has issued 
guidelines for the treatment of patients in PVS. The code of practice advises that legally 
binding advance directives may be made either by specifying the degree of mental 
disability to trigger withdrawal of all treatment, or by refusing specific medical 
procedures. In either case an unambiguous advance directive will have the same force as 
a present refusal by a competent patient. Furthermore, although general preferences have 
no legal standing, the code makes clear that doctors should respect those wishes where 
possible6. 
Thus it appears that although at present the law is inadequate, some steps have been 
taken to clarify the situation, and if indeed Parliament does act to introduce measures 
recommended by the Law Commission, some at least ,of the inadequacies will be 
remedied. However, if the proposed legislation merely translates the common law test of 
best interest into one of statutory best interests which it is reasonable to provide, that in 
itself will do little if anything to curtail an increase in the circumstances under which 
A N H may be withdrawn. I f the decision to withdraw takes into account such factors as 
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family preferences and the allocation of resources, decisions may well be taken much 
earlier. At present in the U K there are upwards of 1500 patients in PVS, and countless 
numbers suffering from severe mental incapacity. At the moment there is no pressure on 
doctors or relatives to request withdrawal. That may not always be the case. Unless 
legislation is able to impose some more definite criteria for withdrawal in all cases, or, 
alternatively limit withdrawal on a no benefit basis to patients in PVS, and set out the 
criteria to be met for all other patients on,a benefit/burden analysis, statutory footing 
would appear no less troublesome than the present common law. Problems of accurate 
and agreed diagnosis dog the differentiation of PVS from other similar conditions but, it 
is submitted, would be preferable to the thin end of the wedge "quality of life" rationale. 
However, resources are not infinite and society must decide how best to allocate them. It 
is submitted nonetheless, that in this particular area a simplistic utilitarian approach may 
not be appropriate, and that the moral case for maintaining the relatively few patients like 
Anthony Bland outweighs any utilitarian argument to the contrary. 
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1 Law Commission. Mental Incapacity: Law Com. No. 231 HMSO 1995. 
2 SCME Vol II Para 258 
3 Ibid para 257. 
Ibid para 292. 
5 Ibid paras 263/4 
6 Advanced Statements about Medical Treatment, BMA 
95 
9. Table of References 
Ahronheim, Judith and Rose Gasner, M: "The Sloganism of Starvation", The Lancet Feb 3 
1990 278. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. : "Ethical Problems in the Management of Some Severely Handicapped 
Children", Commentary 2 Medical Ethics 7: 117-124 (1981) 
Blackstone: Commentaries on the Laws of England (1978) 
Brock, Dan: "Foregoing Life-Sustaining Food and Water: Is It Killin?" in By No Extraordinary 
Means at 117. 
Callahan, Daniel: "Public Policy and the Cessation of Nutrition", in By No Extraordinary 
Means at 61. 
Carson, Ronald A: "The Symbolic Significance of Giving to Eat and Drink" in By No 
Extraordinary Means, at 84 
Childress , James: "When Is It Morally Justifiable To Discontinue Medical Nutrition And 
Hydration?" in By No extraordinary Means at 70 . 
Grubb, Andrew : Commentary: Med. L. Rev. [1993] 247 
Jennett B. and Plum F. : "The Persistent Vegetative State: A Syndrome in Search of a Name", 
Lancet, 1972 734. 
Kennedy, Ian : Commentary: Med. L . Rev. [1994] 108 
Kennedy, Ian and Grubb, A : Medical Law: Text and Materials, 2d Ed. 1994 Butterworths 
Landsman, Ron M. : "Terminating Food and Water: Emerging Legal Rules" in By No 
Extraordinary Means, pl35, at 144. 
Lynn, Joanne : " Switching Off Life Support Machines: The Legal Implications", in Treat Me 
Right, 1988, at 351 
Lynn, Joanne : "By No Extraordinary Means", 1986 
Lynn, Joanne and Childress, James : "Must Patients Always Be Given Food And Water" in By 
No Extraordinary Means at 47 
Meilaender , Gilbert : "On Removing Food and Water: Against the Sfream", Hastings Centre 
Report 14:11-13 (Dec. 1984) 
Micetich, Kenneth, Steinecker, Patricia, and Thomasma, David : Arch. Intern. Med. 143: 975 
978 (1983) "Are Intravenous Fluids Morally Required for a Dying Patient", in By No 
Extraordinary Means at 42. 
Presidents Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research. Declining to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment Washington DC: 
US Govt. Printing Office 1983. 
Smidtz , Phyllice and O'Brien, Merry: "Observations on Nufrition and Hydration in Dying 
Table Of References 
Cancer Patients" in By No Extraordinary Means p39 
Steinbrook , Robert and Lo, Bernard: "Artificial Feeding: Solid Ground Not a slippery Slope", 
New, Eng. Journal of Med. 1988 318 at 286. 
Stone, Julie: "Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment: The Ultimate Decision", N U Feb 1994 
205 at 206 
Williams, Glanville : "Criminal Omissions — The Conventional View" 1991 L.Q.R. at 86 
Zerwekh , Joyce V : "The Dehydration Question", Nursing 83 47-51. 
Reports: 
Law Commission. Mental Incapacity: Law. Com. No. 231 HMSO 1995 
Select Committee On Medical Ethics, House of Lords Report. London HMSO 1994. 
97 
